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[Abstract] The report argues that the strategic cooperation against 
terrorism between the USA and Russia following 9/11 has gradually 
been replaced by a strategic convergence between China and Russia 
around security and economic priorities in Central-Asia. This con-
vergence is visible in an institutionalised cooperation between China and 
Russia in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which also 
faciliates cooperation between these powers and the Central-Asian states. 
The authors question the viability of this new ’multilateralism’, however. 
Both China and Russia have economic and security interests in the 
regions, and although their joining hands might challenge US interests, 
their capacity for shared sovereignty is low. Russia focuses primarily on 
regaining security influence, while Chinese economic and energy interests 
are not compatible with Russia’s.  
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for support granted to this 
project. All viewpoints expressed here are those of the authors, and not of the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) or the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. The authors 
are also – as always – deeply grateful to Susan Høivik for her outstanding work on the final 
draft of this report. 

Introduction  
Following the tragic 9/11 events in the USA, a new strategic partnership 
developed between Russia and the USA. Confronted with a common 
enemy – international terrorism – the Kremlin and Washington launched 
new and unprecedented cooperation. Especially Moscow’s willingness to 
allow the USA into its former backyard, Central Asia, in connection with 
the war in Afghanistan was taken as an indication that Russia had finally 
opted for partnership with the West. Today, however, few would bet on 
this optimistic scenario, and developments on the ground in Central Asia 
testify to the deterioration in cooperation and relations between Russia 
and the USA.  
At the same time, despite a very difficult relationship historically, 
China and Russia have been drawing closer. The two countries started to 
build a ‘strategic partnership’ already in 1996, but rapprochement really 
picked up speed from 2004, when the two governments agreed on 
enhancing cooperation. In Central Asia, improved relations have mani-
fested themselves first and foremost in developments within the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is increasingly viewed 
as a new-style multilateral alliance between the regional powers Russia 
and China.2  
Underlying this shift is not only the realization that Russia and the 
USA do not share interests to the extent imagined back in 20013 whereas 
China and Russia actually share an interest in opposing the USA. The 
shift is also grounded in a growing normative divergence between Russia 
and the USA and an emerging normative convergence between Russia 
and China, visible in their political and economic structures. In Central 
Asia, here seen as a testing field for great-power relations, both Russia 
and China clearly have a ‘normative advantage’ over the USA, because 
the Central Asian regimes have been developing according to political 
and economic models closer to those of Russia and China.  
Despite the growing normative affinity and the easy fit with Central 
Asian regimes, developments and tangible cooperation in Central Asia 
might also reveal limits to the new Moscow–Beijing partnership. New 
and old conflicting real political interests could overshadow the power of 
common interests and the new normative convergence in the long run. 
Moreover, the nature of this normative convergence (authoritarian, 
statist, yet market-oriented government, and an emphasis on state sover-
eignty and non-interference in foreign policy) might prove to be a pro-
blematic foundation for cooperation and constructive interaction.  
                                                 
2 The literature on the SCO is emerging as the organization itself gains in significance. For two 
recent reports, see Ingmar Oldberg, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Power House 
or Paper Tiger’, FOI Report (Swedish Defence Analysis Institute), June 2007, and Alyson 
Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang & Mikhail Troitskiy, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion’, SIPRI Policy Paper, no. 17, May 2007.  
3 We have earlier scrutinized the effect of the US war on terrorism on Russia’s security priori-
ties, and argued that the ‘Bush doctrine’ has served as a template for Russian security policies. 
See Julie Wilhelmsen and Geir Flikke, ‘Evidence of Russia’s Bush Doctrine in the CIS’, Euro-
pean Security, vol. 14, no. 3, 2005, pp. 387–417.  
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The objective of this report is, first, to trace if and how Russia and 
China together have managed to displace the USA in Central Asia in the 
period following 9/11, with special focus on the last three years; and, 
secondly, to uncover the prospects and limits of a new Russian–Chinese 
partnership by scrutinizing their interplay in Central Asia in the security 
and economic spheres.  
Arguably, for both Russia and China cooperation in Central Asia 
marks a first attempt to develop a partnership-based relationship into a 
deeper mutual commitment. The SCO is seen as a more substantial basis 
for long-term cooperation between Russia and China, and this is China’s 
first attempt at inaugurating an international grouping. Central Asia is 
also in many ways the easiest arena for China and Russia to cooperate. It 
is located at a safe distance from the Far East and Siberia, where Russia 
has strong concerns about the influx and influence of Chinese across the 
border and the general dominance of China at the expense of Russia. 
China’s North-Western provinces that border on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan also represent a serious political and ethnic problem 
for China. The Uighurs, who comprise 45% of the population in Xinji-
ang, have a history of resistance to China, and separatism is a real threat. 
Russia for its part has concerns about the Russian population in Kazakh-
stan and its interests in Central Asia: however, this is not Russia proper, 
but more a traditional ‘sphere of influence’, so the risks of cooperation 
may not seem so high. Central Asia is also the region where Russia and 
China most clearly have had a common interest in countering US 
influence and where the increasing Russian–Chinese normative converg-
ence has been mirrored by developments in the Central Asian regimes. 
Finally, all the Central Asian states have been looking for an outside 
partner to serve as the region’s security provider and manager. The 1990s 
vividly proved that they cannot manage on their own, and infighting 
amongst the Central Asian states has hampered their independent inte-
gration. 
In the following we start by assuming that the growing strategic and 
normative convergence between Russia and China on the one hand and 
the growing strategic and normative divergence between Russia and the 
USA on the other seem to bode well for Chinese–Russian cooperation in 
Central Asia, at the expense of US influence.4 This development will be 
traced over time. Additionally, we wish to probe and question the 
strength of the future Chinese–Russian partnership, where we can see 
two main challenges:  
 
• Firstly, disputes over conflicting real interests in Central Asia 
between Russia and China might undermine the strategic and 
normative partnership. Given the heavy security and economic 
                                                 
4 Menon defines strategic convergence as involving multifaceted cooperation and a converg-
ence of views and interests on important questions of international security. It is sustained 
not by trust and goodwill but by calculated self-interest and a desire for leverage vis-à-vis 
third parties, especially the United States. Rajan Menon, ‘The strategic convergence between 
Russia and China’, Survival, vol. 39, no. 2, Summer 1997, p.101. 
Central Asia: Testing Ground for New Great-Power Relations? 5 
interests of both countries in this area, China’s growing power 
and Russia’s view of itself as a regional hegemonic power, inter-
action in Central Asia provides a good litmus test. To what 
extent could colliding interests jeopardize the new partnership, if 
the common interest in fighting Islamic Radicalism and opposing 
US influence that currently underpins the strategic partnership 
should disappear?  
• Secondly, the nature of the Chinese–Russian normative converg-
ence might negatively influence their way of dealing with chal-
lenges and their interaction with each other. Do foreign policies 
that focus on the principle of non-intervention and the sanctity 
of internal affairs facilitate open cooperation and interstate trust? 
Is multilateral interaction in institutions possible in such a set-
ting? Are politically authoritarian regimes that emphasize nation-
nalism capable of building strong partnerships?  
 
We start by outlining US–Russian divergence and Chinese–Russian con-
vergence on the more general level as a background and then briefly out-
line the positions of and interplay between these powers in Central Asia 
in the years between 2001 and 2004, before we move on to trace how 
the new partnership between Russian and China has been played out in 
Central Asia since 2004. Key questions will be whether the USA really 
has lost its influence in the region as a consequence of common Rus-
sian–Chinese efforts to achieve this new convergence, and if there is any 
substance to the Russian–Chinese partnership apart from a shared 
interest in opposing US influence. To answer this latter question we will 
look at positions, interests and modes of interaction both within the 
SCO and bilaterally.  
 
US–Russian Relations: Emerging Divergence 
Throughout the 1990s US–Russian relations wavered between great 
expectations about Russia joining the West and increasing apprehensions 
about Russia’s inability to do so. After a short-lived ‘Westernizer’ period, 
Moscow started from 1996 and onwards to cultivate multi-polarity as a 
world order, prescribing Russia’s place in this world order to that of 
being a world in itself in search of new allies. Multi-polarity was all about 
balancing US hegemony, but it also involved factors of normative con-
vergence with like-minded states.5 As the founding father of this 
approach, Yevgeniy Primakov, stated, a multi-polar order would be more 
‘democratic’, allowing Russia to ‘attain an optimal place in the formation 
of international relations’ based on ‘equality’ (ravnopravie), and to work 
along several vectors, ‘the USA, China, EU, Japan, India, Middle East, 
Latin America, and Africa’.6  
                                                 
5 Thomas Ambrosio, ‘Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity: A Response to US Foreign Policy in 
the Post-Cold War Era’, European Security, vol. 10, no. 1, 2001. 
6 ‘Primakov sleduyet ideyam Gorchakova’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 April 1998.  
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Russia was economically weak after the 1998 collapse of the state 
obligation pyramid (GKO) and the default on IMF payments. Still, the 
overall strategic rationale of Moscow’s policy towards Europe was not 
about joining Western institutions. Russia was pursuing a strategy of 
damage limitation, seeking to forestall the consolidation of a new trans-
Atlantic security system while awaiting a convincing growth in its own 
economy.7 Resistance against NATO enlargement, US missile defence, 
NATO’s Kosovo campaign and proposals to transform the OSCE into a 
pan-European security organization exemplified this strategy. In June 
1999, when preparing the process for a new set of doctrines, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, also indicated that the world should make a 
choice: ‘either a multi-polar system built on the foundations of inter-
national law and supported by the existing institutions, or a unipolar 
model built on the domination of one single superpower’. 8 Also, at the 
height of the Kosovo crisis, Russia, China and India were the only states 
to vote for a Security Council resolution denouncing the NATO air-
strikes as a violation of the UN Charter.9 
Arguably, although Russia sought political rapprochement with the 
West after Kosovo, its military doctrine and national security concept 
were revised to fit the challenges of multi-polarity. An offshoot of this 
was a rapid warming of relations between the European Union, seeking a 
role as a new ‘soft power’ in international relations after Kosovo, and a 
Russia eager to reshape its foreign policy image. While the EU Commis-
sion framed a separate Russia strategy in 1999 singling out Russia as a 
strategic partner for the EU’s evolving foreign and security policy, Russia 
increasingly spoke of the ‘high value’ of a separate EU–Russia strategic 
partnership, and embraced Europe as an ideal for internal transforma-
tion.10 However, the discrepancy between Putin’s assertion that Russia 
was fighting against terrorism and doing a service to Europe in this 
regard, and the waging of a war in Chechnya that ran roughshod over all 
human rights could not be ignored, tarnishing Russia’s European aspira-
tions.  
Relations with the USA were looking less promising. To be sure, 
Russia also prepared the grounds for a new strategic outlook by ratifying 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NTP) and Start II in 2000. Moreover, Putin’s surprise announce-
ment that a ‘political NATO’ could be acceptable for Russia shaped the 
image of a new Russia that the West could do business with.11 However, 
when Clinton paid his last visit to Russia in 2000, Putin tried to convince 
him that if the USA proceeded with its unilateral disbandment of the 
                                                 
7 Sergei Medvedev, ‘Power, Space and Russian Foreign Policy’ in Ted Hopf (ed), Understandings 
of Russian Foreign Policy (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 
15–55.  
8 Igor Ivanov, ‘Rossiya v menyayushchemsya mire’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 June 1999.  
9 Ambrosio, ‘Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity’, p. 62. 
10 Putin even talked loftily about Russia belonging inherently to the European family. See 
Vladimir Putin, Ot pervogo litsa, Moscow, 2000. 
11 This argument is especially developed in Peter Truscott, Putin’s Progress (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 2004) and with considerable detail in J.L. Black, Vladimir Putin and the New 
World Order: Looking East, Looking West? (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004). 
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ABM Treaty, Russia would take ‘reciprocal action’.12 Russia also reached 
out to China on the issue of ‘strategic balance’, as Putin in 2000 appealed 
to China to consider the US warnings that it would unilaterally leave the 
ABM Treaty as ‘destroying the strategic balance’ in international rela-
tions, and hinting that Russia would make an effort to restore it.13 The 
USA was concerned that Moscow’s proposals of a European missile 
defence were merely an attempt to create fuzziness in trans-Atlantic rela-
tions, and the Nixon Center warned against Russian ‘spoiling’ effects in 
the international order.14 When George W. Bush met Vladimir Putin in 
Slovenia in 2001, this was a meeting between the leaders of a two coun-
tries that were ‘neither enemies, nor allies’, as Ariel Cohen put it. The 
USA would pursue its interests with or without Russia. The strategic 
agenda was summarized as strategic disarmament, talks on non-prolifera-
tion issues (China, Iran, Iraq and North Korea), US plans for implement-
ing missile defence, the sovereignty and integrity of the newly indepen-
dent states (Ukraine and Georgia), and the internal matters of freedom 
of the press, and Chechnya. In sum, Russia was invited to a conditional 
partnership, one in which the USA would make clear the ‘consequences 
of establishing formal regional alliances with China, Iran, or other states 
hostile to the United States’.15  
The catastrophic events of 9/11 simultaneously altered the percep-
tion of security challenges and set the stage for a closer and more direct 
relationship between the USA and Russia. Echoing Rajan Menon’s defi-
nition of ‘strategic convergence’ as a ‘multifaceted cooperation and a 
convergence of views and interests on important questions of inter-
nationnal security’,16 Washington and Moscow in 2001 and 2002 seemed 
set for a comprehensive rapprochement at several levels. First, both 
recognized international terrorism as the primary threat to international 
security. The domestic threat of radical Islamism in southern Russia 
manifested itself in Putin’s speeches as unconditional support to the 
USA. At the practical level, Russia provided intelligence support, and 
over-flight permissions. Putin also more explicitly evoked the ‘Western-
izer’ discourse, by stating that Russia would be stronger in defending its 
interests if it were part of the international community: ‘If Russia is a 
full-fledged member of the international community, it may, in uphold-
ing its national interests in this sphere, derive benefits from such coope-
ration’, Putin said.17 Second, the Western security community revived its 
                                                 
12 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Random 
House,  2003), p. 372. 
13 Ambrosio, ‘Russia’s Quest for Multipolarity’, p. 52.  
14 ‘What is to be Undone? A Russia Policy Agenda for the New Administration’, Nixon Center 
Report, February 2001, at:  
http://www.nixoncenter.org/Russia%20Policy%20Paper%20All.pdf, last accessed 13 Dec-
ember 2007. 
15 Ariel Cohen, ‘An Agenda for the Bush-Putin Summit in Slovenia’, 11 June 2001, available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1447.cfm, accessed on 15 Novem-
ber, 2007.  
16 Rajan Menon, ‘The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China’, Survival, vol. 39, no. 2, 
Summer 1997, p. 101. 
17 John O’Loughlin et al., ‘A Risky Westward Turn? Putin’s 9-11 Script and Ordinary Russians’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 2004, p. 14.  
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engagement with Russia. A US–Russian statement from 13 November 
2001 said that ‘the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allies 
against terrorism, regional instability and other threats’, and that the 
OSCE should develop as a representative and inclusive organization. 18 
The inclusion of Russia in the Russia–NATO Council in May 2002 
revived the security dialogue with the Kremlin on issues of non-prolifer-
ation, peacekeeping and crisis management, but potentially also the dial-
ogue on internal transformation and civil control over military forces.19  
Questions were pending, however, as to whether this would manifest 
itself in a normative convergence. The joint US–Russian statement of 13 
November 2001 outlined the framework for a considerable reversal of 
former apprehensions, setting the relationship within a commitment to a 
liberal order and democratic standards. The statement was founded on 
the ‘commitment to the values of democracy, the free market and rule of 
law’, and that ‘neither country regards the other as an enemy or threat’.20 
Clearly, this point involved a deeper Russian dedication to internal 
reforms. Russia’s aborted reforms of the 1990s seemed an ill harbinger 
for long-term normative convergence and could potentially undermine 
the prospects for a strategic partnership against international terrorism. 
The common stance of Russia and the Western Hemisphere against 
terrorism was demonstrated in concrete foreign policy choices. When in 
December 2001 the USA withdrew from the ABM Treaty,21 Putin’s con-
tribution to the ‘Westernizer’ approach of a new Russia was not to make 
a big political issue of this, but to focus instead on achieving a bilateral 
agreement on reductions of strategic warheads with the USA. Russia’s 
tempered reaction, and the general focus on cooperative security, 
manifested itself in the 24 May 2002 Moscow Treaty on strategic arms 
reductions, which stipulated a reduction of warheads by 2012, albeit 
without intermediate deadlines or clauses committing the parties to 
observe the limits beyond that year.  
In the wake of the Moscow Treaty, Russia and the USA also signed 
an agreement on a new strategic relationship. At a subsequent press 
event at St. Petersburg University in May 2002, Bush stated that ‘the 
American people truly appreciated the cooperative spirit of the Russian 
government, and truly appreciate the sympathies of the Russian people 
for what took place on 9/11’. Moreover, Bush announced that his 
government would support WTO membership for Russia, and ‘do every-
thing possible to make relations with Russia strong and friendly and 
cooperative and productive for both people’.22 Subsequently, the US 
Department of Commerce granted Russia market economy status in 
                                                 
18 http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18016.htm#5, last accessed 7 December 2007.  
19 For this, see Oksana Antonenko, ‘Russia and the Deadlock Over Kosovo’, Survival, vol. 49, 
no. 3, 2007, pp. 91 – 106, p. 94, where she outlines that R-NAC appointed a working group 
on common approaches to peacekeeping. Antonenko also concedes that the Kremlin 
increasingly sees NATO as a threat. 
20 Ibid. 
21 For a more detailed story, see Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, The Kremlin Rising: Vladimir 
Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), pp. 136–37. 
22 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020525-2.html, last accessed 7 
December 2007.  
Central Asia: Testing Ground for New Great-Power Relations? 9 
June 2002, ten days after the EU.23 The USA and Russia would start 
bilateral negotiations on WTO accession from 2002 and onwards, and 
Washington also pressed for wider use of economic incentives to combat 
threats to global security. At the July 2002 G-7 meeting in Kananaskis, 
the USA proposed that the G-7 countries should provide USD 20 billion 
over a ten-year period to non-proliferation programs in Russia and the 
former Soviet space, thus linking the issue of economic recovery and 
Russia’s new status as a G-8 member to a broader security agenda. The 
USA pledged to cover half of this, with the EU, Japan and Canada pro-
viding the rest. The G-8 summit also confirmed that Russia would host 
the summit in 2006. 24 
With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see that the partnership 
that developed between the USA and Russia after 9/11 was based on the 
pursuit of interests. Certainly, there was a strong feeling of identification 
and sympathy with the USA immediately after the terrorist events, and 
also recollections among Russians of the effect of the explosions of 
apartment blocks in 1999. Still, Putin’s ‘u-turn’ in foreign and security 
policies after 9/11, when he allowed flights and bases in Central Asia and 
gave intelligence support, was partially making a virtue out of necessity.25 
Russia could not cope with the security challenge by itself, and US pres-
ence was desired as a new way in which to evoke a stronger partnership 
to meet Russian interests.  As Sharyl Cross has observed, ‘the pragmatic/ 
realist approach championed by Russia’s President recognized the contri-
butions that partnering with the United States and NATO could bring to 
Russia in terms of resources for defeating the terrorist threat to Russia’s 
soil’.26 Hence, rather than a convergence in the full sense, 9/11, in the 
words of Anatol Lieven, opened up the ‘possibility of a new era of 
limited cooperation among the world’s major states’, in which the USA 
could act as ‘consensual hegemon’.27 Washington recognized Russian 
weakness, but also the threats to US strategic interests stemming from 
the adjacent regions to the post-Soviet space. As for the Kremlin, close 
cooperation with Washington could tally with the ambition of 
strengthening the Russian state. Andrei Tsygankov thus stated in his ana-
lysis of Putin’s foreign and security policy that Putin strove to reduce the 
challenge to Russian homeland security, while gaining a dividend in eco-
nomic modernization. In this perspective, Putin ‘believed that – as a 
                                                 
23 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2032498.stm, last accessed 7 December 2007. 
24 Aleksander Belkin, ‘US-Russia Relations and the Global Counter-Terrorist Campaign’, Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 2004, and  
http://www.rferl.org/reports/securitywatch/2002/07/24-020702.asp, last accessed 10 
December 2007.  
25 See Roy Allison, ‘Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s Central Asia Policy’, International Affairs, 
vol. 80, no. 2, 2004, pp. 277–293, at p. 278. 
26 Sharyl Cross, ‘Russia’s Relationship with the United States/NATO in the US-led Global War 
on Terrorism’, Slavic Military Studies, vol. 19, 2006, p. 179.  
27 Lieven suggests that the post 9/11 threat of international terrorism produced a consensus 
among affected states that response was necessary. For the USA, it opened an opportunity to 
fuse military supremacy with diplomatic skill, but, according to Lieven, US cooperation with 
states on other areas than anti-terrorism has been limited. Anatol Liven, ‘The Secret Police-
men’s Ball: the United States, Russia and the international order after 11 September’, Inter-
national Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, 2002, pp. 245 – 259, at p. 247.  
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stateless phenomenon – terrorism was a challenge to the very system of 
states’.28 Putin’s device against the weakening of Russia’s position in the 
international system was increasingly to centralize Russia politically and 
to focus on economic modernization.  
During 2002, the partnership weakened in part because new conflicts 
of interest emerged and old ones, which had been pushed aside, re-
emerged and proved more powerful than the common interest in the 
fight against international terrorism. Throughout 2002–2003, the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs underscored not only that partnership rela-
tions were close, but that Russian officials interacted with and met US 
officials on a regular basis and at several government levels. Yet, US–
Russian relations were forged primarily as a personal relationship 
between two presidents, 29 and also – from the US side – conditioned on 
a change in Russia’s strategic culture and bureaucracy. Moscow would 
hardly let the USA come too close in prescribing internal changes in 
Russia. Moreover, in 2002, Russia was increasingly apprehensive of the 
impact of the US fight against international terrorism. The Bush admini-
stration put the concept of pre-emptive strikes into play in the larger 
framework of using the US position ‘of unparalleled strength and influ-
ence to create a balance of power that favors freedom’, calling Russia ‘an 
important partner in the war on terror [which] is reaching toward a 
future of greater democracy and economic freedom’, as Condoleezza 
Rice stated. She added: ‘as it does so, our relationship will continue to 
broaden and deepen’.30 Simultaneously, a Russian version of pre-emptive 
strikes became manifest. When armed Chechen separatists took hostages 
at the Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002, Putin and government 
officials repeatedly stated that Russia would pursue the terrorist threat 
relentlessly and that military force might be set in to fight terrorist bases 
in third countries.31 These statements reverberated in the internal context 
as Putin’s ‘strong man’ image since 1999, when he was emerging as 
prime minister in the wake of the 1999 bombings of apartment blocks,32 
but was also supported as a broader government policy by subsequent 
statements from the  leaders of the General Staff and the Ministry of 
Defence.  
Clearly, although Russia had not as of 2002 adopted the concepts of 
pre-emptive use of force and preventive military action in its security 
doctrines, its leaders had nevertheless structured official policy state-
ments so as to echo the significance of these concepts for Russia’s 
secureity interests. This, however, did not rest on an inter-state converg-
ence of a lasting consensus in international relations, as argued by 
                                                 
28 Andrei P. Tsygankov, ‘Vladimir Putin’s Vision of Russia as a Normal Country’, Post-Soviet 
Affairs, vol. 21, no. 2, 2005, pp. 132 – 158, at p.144.  
29 This assertion is shared by Aleksander Belkin, ‘US-Russia Relations and the Global Counter-
Terrorist Campaign’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 17, no.1, 2004, p. 15.  
30 Condoleezza Rice, ‘A Balance of Power that Favour Freedom’, at: 
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4rice.htm, last accessed 10 December 
2007.  
31 For this, see Flikke & Wilhelmsen, ‘Evidence…’, pp. 393 – 94.  
32 In fact, Putin had loftily described a resolution of the situation in the Caucasus as his ‘histori-
cal mission’. ‘Zheleznyy Putin’, Kommersant, 10 March, 2000.  
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some.33 Russia could potentially and de facto interpret this norm in 
accordance with its own strategic interests. In fact, Russia committed 
itself on the one hand to the supremacy of the UN Charter as the single 
dominant normative framework for such actions, but was also seeking a 
regional mandate that would give it a clearly defined peacekeeping role as 
the dominant military power in the CIS, in conjunction with NATO and 
under a UN mandate.34 To prescribe this norm as a template for action, 
Russia initiated air-strikes against assumed terrorist bases on Georgian 
territory, thus assuming a military posture of its own within the CIS 
sphere of influence. While apparently in line with a ‘consensus’ on pre-
emptive use of force, this posture potentially also involved a stronger 
Russian leverage in the post-Soviet space.  
As the USA in 2003 prepared for armed action against Iraq, the full 
implications of the new template for action became clear for Russia. 
Moscow returned to its multi-polar script and downplayed the signific-
ance of the US–Russian partnership. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey 
Ivanov, told a Moscow audience in March that he was convinced that a 
unipolar system did not reflect the needs of global security: ‘under condi-
tions of US dominance in the economic sphere, Washington’s announce-
ment that it will take a leading position in security affairs will meet covert 
or open counter-actions from a large group of states’, he indicated.35 
Whether Russia would take a leading position in this was not specified, 
but a distinct policy of balancing US power re-emerged. Also in 2003, 
Russia insisted that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was the sole 
foundation for an Iraq policy for the international community, and 
Russia’s position at the UN Security Council enabled its to join hands 
with France and Germany for the principles of the UN Charter. Thus, 
Russia converted a growing apprehension of declining sovereignty and 
increasing US power in the international system into a ‘European’ vector 
for underpinning the significance of these values at the global level. Rus-
sia also initiated a new vector in a bilateral meeting with Iran in March 
2003, where Russia committed itself to inter-departmental talks with Iran 
on the challenges of international terrorism and the supremacy of the 
UN Charter.36 
From 2003, the partnership began to crack. At the Bush–Putin sum-
mit in September 2003, the US president reiterated his government’s 
commitment to focus on a broader partnership than that of a pragmatic 
partnership in fighting global terrorism. ‘Today our relationship is broad 
and strong’, he said, adding that the USA would like to bring the rela-
                                                 
33 See Peter Dombrowski and Rodger A. Payne, ‘The Emerging Consensus for Preventive 
War’, Survival, vol. 48, no. 2, 2006.  
34 See Aleksander Nikitin, ‘Preemptive Military Action and the Legitimate Use of Force: A Rus-
sian View’, unpublished paper for the CEPS/IISS European Security Forum, 13 January 
2003. Dov Lynch has observed that this included to ‘ensure the centrality of the UN in the 
formation of a new world order’ while striving to ‘rethink the scope of self-defence and the 
preventive use of force’. Dov Lynch, ‘The Enemy is at the Gate: Russia After Beslan’, Inter-
national Affairs, vol. 81, no. 1, 2004, pp. 141–161, at p. 151. 
35 ‘Speech by Minister Igor Ivanov at the Moscow State Linguistic University’, 10 March 2003, 
at: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/F86F1E321D750A2443256CE500460763  
36 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/ED83168FAC44510143256CE60053CC49  
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tionship to a new level: ‘I respect President Putin’s vision for Russia: a 
country at peace within its borders, with its neighbours and with the 
world, a country in which democracy, freedom and the rule of law 
thrive’.37 Putin echoed this by stating that Russia and the USA had ‘a 
special responsibility for ensuring international security and strengthen-
ing strategic stability’, and that the war on terror was more than a stra-
tegic partnership: ‘in this sphere […] we are allies’. 38   
Russia was not approaching democratic standards, however. In 
domestic affairs, Putin’s quest for empowering the state broke with the 
script of democratization and rule of law. The raid against Yukos, start-
ing from the summer of 2003, threw spanners in the works for a US–
Russian energy dialogue and opened for a state-led takeover of the 
energy sector. Moreover, liberal parties were outflanked by Kremlin-
orchestrated electoral blocs. Unified Russia, the electoral vehicle for pro-
Putin forces, gained by and large excessive public policy space as the 
drive towards reining in free media outlets increased. The Kremlin used 
the Duma elections to create conditions favourable to the re-election of 
Putin, and the campaign managers of the presidential bid interfered 
directly by telling candidates to drop out of the election campaign.39 The 
military reforms initiated in 2002 also stalled.40 Reform experiments 
culminated in the  ‘Ivanov doctrine’ in 2003, which represented a nomi-
nal victory for the Russian Ministry of Defence in presenting the guide-
lines for military development, and induced also the tacit suggestion that 
the General Staff had not taken into account the nature of modern war-
fare and conflict.41 Yet, the Russian army was not reformed. The 
Ministry of Defence signalled that modernization would ensue, and that 
the period of reforms was over. Moreover, the timing of the Ivanov doc-
trine was – according to analysts – tailored to match the re-election bid 
of the Putin crew in the 2003/2004 electoral cycle.42 Hence, although 
necessitated by the pressing need for military reforms in Russia, the doc-
trine failed to deliver on the Westernization vector of political transfor-
mation. 
Russia’s slide away from internal democratization had been fore-
shadowed by its obstructive policies in the OSCE. From 2002, multi-
lateral cooperation within the OSCE had become increasingly more diffi-
cult, and attempts to reach a common political statement were to no 
                                                 
37 The Associated Press, 27 September 2003, at: http://newsmine.org/archive/cabal-
elite/globalization/putin-bush-meet-camp-david.txt, last accessed 4 December 2007.  
38 Ibid. 
39  Ibid. 
40 The scale of the experiment was one year, starting from September 2002, and Russian politi-
cal parties, such as the Union of Right Forces, invested politically in this to front it as yet another 
attempt of Russia to Westernize and join efforts with the West.  Dale R. Herspring, ‘Putin 
and Military Reform’, in Dale R. Herspring (ed), Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 185– 204, at p. 192.  
41 Matthew Bouldin, ‘The Ivanov Doctrine and Military Reform: Reasserting Stability in Russia’, 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, 2004, p. 625. The doctrine took into account the 
character of regional conflicts, and included a focus on the regional web of new security 
institutions, such as the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with China 
(SCO). We return to this below. 
42 Ibid. p. 626. 
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avail. Russia interpreted the closure of the OSCE observer missions in 
Latvia and Estonia as directed against the rights of ethnic Russians 
abroad, and the OSCE was also stalemated by Russia’s failure to meet 
the time-frame for withdrawal from Transniestr (2001) and Georgia 
(2002). In 2003, a Russian initiative to federalize Moldova was launched 
without meeting the deadlines for the withdrawal of Russian military per-
sonnel from the illegitimate Transniestr republic. The Russian proposal 
was not coordinated with the OSCE, and was presented as almost a fait 
accompli for the organization’s negotiators.43 The OSCE/ODHIR state-
ment on Russia’s 2003 and 2004 elections as ‘free but not fair’, subse-
quently added to Russian dissatisfaction with the organization. Increas-
ingly, Russia found itself confronting what it saw as a biased approach of 
the OSCE to the post-Soviet space, and put down a veto against new 
observer missions in Ukraine.44 
As Russia turned away from internal Westernization, the rhetorical 
overtures of a multi-polar world order were stepped up. In an article in 
Russia and Global Affairs in January 2004, Minister of Defence, Sergey 
Ivanov, stated that Russia’s regional security interests would have first 
priority: ‘developing relations with the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) is one of the priority foreign policy lines for Russia. Our 
country desires to continue to strengthen the potential for coordination 
of the military-political activities of the CIS countries within the existing 
structures and institutions, and primarily the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO)’. Moreover, on NATO, Ivanov was unambiguous. 
The relationship to NATO was based on the Rome declaration from 
2002, he stated, and added: ‘Russia keeps a close watch on NATO’s 
ongoing transformation and hopes for a complete removal of direct and 
indirect anti-Russian elements from the military plans and political 
declarations of its member states. However, if NATO remains a military 
alliance with an offensive military doctrine, Russia will have to revise its 
military planning and principles regarding the development of its armed 
forces, including its nuclear forces’.45 General Colonel Yuriy Baluyevskiy, 
chief of the Russian General Staff, revealed a similar line of reasoning:  
 
There is no other choice but for the world to be multi-polar otherwise it will 
lose its stability. It is my strong belief that Washington remained the ‘sole 
pole of power’ for only eighteen months, starting from the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington until the U.S. started 
its war on Iraq on March 20, 2003. During that period the U.S. had not only 
the strongest military power, but also the legitimacy to lead the world com-
munity in countering international terrorism. However, the U.S. pointedly 
                                                 
43 See John Löwenhardt, ‘The OSCE, Moldova and Russian Diplomacy in 2003’, Journal of Com-
munist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 20, no. 4, 2004.  
44 Victor Yves-Ghebali, ‘Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Pan-Euro-
pean Expectations’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 3, 2005.  
45 Sergey Ivanov, ‘Russia’s Geopolitical Priorities and Armed Forces’, Russia in Global Affairs, 
no. 1, January–February 2004. 
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ignored the opinions voiced by other countries and demonstrated a 
profound reluctance to compromise its own interests.46 
 
The Beslan tragedy in August–September 2004 was a shocking demon-
stration of Russia’s new security challenges and a decisive factor in the 
reshaping of Russia’s political system. In a decisive move in September 
2004, Putin cancelled direct elections of governors in the country’s fede-
ral districts and subordinated the governors to direct nominations from 
Moscow. The mixed electoral system yielded to a fully proportional elec-
toral system with a higher threshold – a move that effectively boosted 
the parties that had cleared the hurdles in 2003, but left others outside 
the elected institutions. Finally, Putin proposed that the voice of civil 
society should be channelled through a ‘council’, effectively nominated 
by the presidential administration.47  
Russia also propped up state ownership in the energy sector, thereby 
stalling the prospects for international ownership. In September 2004, 
Gazprom aired a merger with Rosneft that would bring the state from an 
initial 39% share in the Gazprom stocks up to a 50 plus one share of the 
merged company. Although the merger failed, Rosneft still ended up as 
state controlled, and stripped off Yukos assets through acquiring 
Yuganskneftegaz in 2006. At rock bottom, starting from 2003/2004 the 
state moved into the energy sector, and the state-controlled gas sector 
was quickly converted to a tool for foreign policy leverage within the 
CIS. In late 2004, prompted by Russia’s increasing dissatisfaction with 
US and EU support to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Putin revived 
multi-polarity as the guiding beacon of his country’s priorities. Attending 
a military parade held by would-be president and Russia-friendly oligarch 
Victor Yanukovich in Kiev on the eve of the crucial 2004 presidential 
elections in Ukraine, Putin stated: ‘But I, for one, believe that the world 
can only be multi-polar. Only a multi-polar world can have internal 
energy and stimuli for its development’.48 The meaning of these words 
was vividly demonstrated when Gazprom turned off the gas transit to 
European markets through Ukraine on 1 January 2006 – the first day of 
the enforcement of the Constitutional amendment that stipulated Ukra-
ine’s transition to a parliamentary-presidential political system.  
Despite the overtures to a strategic partnership, the script followed 
by Russia in 2003–2005 diverged from reforms. Moscow argued that it 
was a ‘sovereign democracy’ – a phrase coined by Kremlin strategists to 
capture not only the new strength of the Russian state in the oil-driven 
economy, but also to allege foreign interference in internal Russian 
affairs.49 Apparently apprehensive of the new US focus on democratiza-
                                                 
46 Yuriy Baluevskiy, ‘Strategic Stability in a Global World: A Common Agenda for Russia and 
the United States’, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 4, October–December 2003.  
47 ‘Putin to strengthen Kremlin’s control’, Financial Times, 14 September 2004.  
48 RFE/RL Newsline, 27 October  2004. 
49 The phrase was coined by Vladislav Surkov at a Unified Russia congress in February 2006. His 
long speech delved into almost all possible aspects of Russian sovereignty, basing it on the 
principles of political unity, Russia as an energy superpower, the central role of the secret 
police in fighting terrorism, and Russia’s future as a ‘free nation in a more democratic world 
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tion fronted by George W. Bush on the eve of the US–Russian summit 
in Bratislava, and also the effect of the ‘colour revolutions’ in Ukraine, 
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, Russian officials throughout 2005 increasingly 
stressed that Russian NGOs were being supported from abroad. In 
November 2005, the Russian State Duma voted on new legislation that 
would force NGOs and charities to re-register and provide extensive 
documentation about their activities and finances. Chairman of the 
Duma’s committee on Constitutional Affairs, Vladimir Pligin, put it 
bluntly: ‘we must toughen control over the activities of certain organiza-
tions, including some foreign NGOs’.50 This coincided with a new law 
floated by Unified Russia as a part of the 2006 budget to allocate funding 
of about USD 17 million to ‘Russian’ NGOs fronting the rights of 
Russians abroad and a specific version of Russian civil society.51 Russian 
claims of a ‘double standard’ were also heard even with greater fre-
quency. In November 2005, deputy minister of foreign affairs, Aleksey 
Grushko, lashed out against the ODHIR and the OSCE for applying 
what was seen as an ‘unacceptable’ focus on the post-Soviet space in 
monitoring activities. He lamented that the OSCE did not send obser-
vers to Germany or Poland, but only to the post-Soviet space, and 
warned that Russia would front this at the OSCE meeting in Ljubljana in 
December 2005.52 
Starting in 2002, US–Russian strategic convergence was based on 
increased economic interaction. These prospects suffered a severe set-
back after Iraq, and in 2006 a new blow was dealt to US–Russian rela-
tions. Interestingly, problems emerged in the conjunction between eco-
nomic interests and norms. In 2006, Putin had set the stage for the G-8 
summit in St. Petersburg as a framework for finalizing with the USA the 
accession issues still pending, but in July 2006, negotiations broke off, 
with the US requiring more progress in trade concessions in order to get 
the agreement passed by Congress. Gazprom responded by saying that 
the announcement on access for foreign companies to the Shtockman 
field in the Barents Sea would be delayed.53 The subsequent meeting 
between the two presidents reflected the degree of normative divergence 
that had been building up since 2005. At a short news conference, Bush 
stated: ‘I talked about my desire to promote institutional change in parts 
of the world like Iraq […] and I told him that a lot of people in my 
country would hope that Russia would do the same thing’, while Putin 
replied staunchly that ‘we would certainly not like to have the same kind 
of democracy as in Iraq’.54 Certainly, in November 2006, the last bilateral 
hurdles for entry were cleared, and US negotiators stated that an agree-
                                                 
order’. See Vladislav Surkov, ‘Suverentitet – eto politicheskiy sinonim konkurento-
sposobnosti’, 22 February 2006, at http://www.edinros.ru/print.html?id=111148.  
50 RFE/RL Newsline, 23 November 2005. 
51 RFE/RL Newsline 21 November, 2005. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Martin Crutsinger, ‘Russia WTO Entry Negotiations Break Off’, Washington Post, 15 July 
2006, at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2006/07/15/AR2006071500207.html  
54 ‘U.S.,Russia Fail to Agree on WTO Membership’, Associated Press, 15 July 2006, at: 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13855682/  
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ment had been reached ‘in principle’. However, observers warned, Russia 
had still to confirm the bilateral agreements with Moldova and Georgia, 
and make progress in multilateral accession negotiations.55  
Russia’s assertiveness toward the West peaked in 2007, when Putin 
lambasted US policies at the Munich security forum in February 2007 for 
its missile defence plans in Poland and the Czech Republic. Putin aide 
Sergey Yastrzhembskiy stated that norms no longer mattered. He under-
scored that ‘Russia is back as a world player’, and that Putin had been 
‘tough rather than aggressive, which is fully in the keeping with the cur-
rent principles of international politics’.56 Following in the vein of 
national interests, Putin subsequently announced a moratorium on the 
CFE Treaty in April 2007, awaiting the Duma’s and Federation Council’s 
ratification to suspend the treaty. In November 2007 Russia suspended 
the CFE agreement, alleging that ‘colonial conditions had been imposed 
on Russia at a time of weakness.57 The discarding of the CFE conflated 
with the row over election observation during the December Duma elec-
tions, which resulted in ODIHR not sending observers at all. Moreover, 
in response to US plans for a strategic defence system in Poland and the 
Czech Republic, Russia again asserted that the missile defence elements 
would undoubtedly be aimed against Russia and that it would be impos-
sible to participate in the joint project for theatre anti-missile defence 
with NATO.58 Russia also proposed deploying the new Russian 
Iskander-M tactical missile in Belarus as a material ‘counter-measure’ to 
the US threat.59  The background for all this was the lack of respect 
shown for the restored might of Russia. 
Clearly, from the starting point of a possible strategic convergence in 
2001, US– Russian relations have revealed a new set of animosities. Our 
argument is that as US–Russian divergence became evident, Chinese–
Russian convergence increased. We now proceed to expand this argu-
ment by looking into the degree of convergence in Chinese–Russia rela-
tions within the paradigm of multi-polarity and in the normative outlook 
on international relations.  
 
Chinese–Russian Relations: Emerging Convergence  
Historically, Russia and China have had an uneasy relationship. At the 
end of the 1960s, China changed from being the Soviets’ best friend to 
becoming a fierce enemy. Both countries claimed to be the leading force 
in the Communist movement: the animosity even resulted in military 
                                                 
55 ‘Russia and US Reach Deal on WTO’, Financial Times, 10 November 2006, at: 
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56 RFE/RL Newsline, 23 February 2007.  
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clashes60 and a Chinese declaration of claims on Russian territory in Asia, 
followed by almost open preparation for war. Mao came to consider the 
USSR and not the USA ‘the main source of the world war’, and Soviet 
propaganda depicted China as a dangerous enemy with expansionist 
plans and an ally of the USA against the USSR. This animosity was to 
last for over 30 years. Only in May 1989, following Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
visit to China, were relations declared ‘normal’. 
In the mid-1990s the relationship between Russia and China under-
went a further change. China was rising to the position of a new world 
power, and in this process its foreign policy became directed primarily 
towards not provoking the USA. At the same time China was engaging 
in limited balancing behaviour in reaction to the US predominance.61 In 
Russia, the basically pro-Western foreign policy orientation was, as 
noted, replaced by Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov’s concept of the 
multi-polar world order, with its edge against US predominance. This 
implied that the Kremlin’s foreign policy to a greater degree would be 
directed at balancing US power in the world – and Russia saw China as 
one such potential balancing partner.  
These overlapping orientations as well as common interests in deve-
loping trade relations led to the April 1996 agreement on building a 
‘strategic partnership’ between Russia and China, later confirmed and 
declared by President Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin during a visit by the 
Chinese leader to Moscow in April 1997.62 The warming ties between 
Moscow and Beijing had already resulted in a cooperation accord on 
fighting crime and drug trafficking along their common border in 1996, 
and were further underpinned by efforts at boosting economic and 
military ties.63 The Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military 
Field in the Border Areas, signed by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Russia in Shanghai in April 1996, which marked the 
establishment of the Shanghai Five, and the Agreement on Mutual 
Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas signed by the same 
countries in April the following year, were manifestations of the new 
cooperative relationship between China and Russia in the Central Asian 
arena.  
Increasing cooperation with China was viewed by Russia as a 
counterweight to the Western vector in its foreign policy. This was 
clearly demonstrated in Primakov’s words on his first anniversary as 
foreign minister: ‘If we declare China to be our strategic partner, we now 
                                                 
60 These concerned the island of Zhenbao in the Ussuri River and Lake Zhalanashkol in 1969, 
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61 For a good overview of China’s strategies for coping with US power, see Denny Roy, 
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mean that as seriously as if we were referring to Washington or Bonn.’64 
Despite repeated claims that their new cooperation was not aimed at 
third countries, the statements resulting from the presidential meetings 
between Zemin and Yeltsin in this period seemed to indicate that their 
cooperation was indeed a balancing act65 aimed at strengthening their 
positions on issues where they felt that Washington did not listen to 
them. Thus, the December 1999 summit between Zemin and Yeltsin 
concluded with joint statements that no country should ‘interfere in 
another sovereign country’s attack against domestic terrorism’ (directed 
at US criticism of Russia’s conduct in Chechnya and possibly at Chinese 
policies against the Uighurs fighting for independence in Xinjiang), that 
Russia supports ‘China’s principled stand on the Taiwan issue’ and that 
attempts to violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were ‘unaccept-
able’. They also expressed ‘deep regret’ over the US Senate’s refusal to 
ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and opposed the 
‘reinforcing and expanding of military blocs’ (a reference to NATO 
expansion).66 
Closer examination of the discourse following the development of 
the Shanghai Five also reveals that, despite the heavy focus on 
cooperation on regional security issues such as separatism, terrorism, 
crime and on economic issues, the initiative was clearly aimed at creating 
a counterbalance to the USA. While Boris Yeltsin said, on arriving in 
Bishkek for the Shanghai Five summit in August 1999, that he was pre-
pared for a ‘fight against the Westerners’, President Jiang Zemin in a 
clear reference to the USA stated during the summit that hegemony and 
the politics of force were on the rise and he condemned all ‘forms of so-
called neo-interventionism’.67 Indeed, the final declaration of the summit 
stressed the Shanghai Five’s commitment to countering the perceived US 
domination.68  
However, the rapprochement between Russia and China in the 1990s 
was only the small beginning of what Rajan Menon called ‘strategic 
convergence’.69 There were clearly limits to a Chinese–Russian partner-
ship built primarily on the rationale of counterbalancing the USA. 
Although a new trust seemed to be growing, there was still a long way to 
go. Accompanying a more positive image of China in Russia were fears 
of the ‘yellow peril’: the prospect that Chinese immigration in the Far 
East would threaten Russian national security and undermine Russia’s 
position in this region in the long term. At this point there was also still a 
huge gap between a Russian economy in crisis, a deteriorated army and a 
weak state on the one side, and a booming Chinese economy directed by 
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a fairly operational and strong political regime.70 In this situation there 
were few prospects of an equal partnership. China did not want an 
alliance with a weak and unpredictable Russia, and Russia would be 
highly reluctant to play the role of a little brother in a new partnership 
with China. Moreover, even the common drive to counterbalance the 
USA was undercut by the fact that neither Beijing nor Moscow was pre-
pared to suffer permanent harm to relations with Washington for the 
sake of a closer Chinese–Russian union. Russia was dependent on the 
USA for investments and access to technology, while China needed the 
USA as a market and also as a source of technology. Trade between 
Russia and China was ten times less than that between China and the 
USA at the time; moreover, it was limited to the sale of Russian military 
equipment and weapons in exchange for cheap Chinese commodity 
goods. According to Dmitri Trenin, economic ties between Russia and 
China actually entered a period of stagnation in the late 1990s.71 Lastly, 
despite Russian arms sales to China, there were no signs of military 
cooperation becoming a component of the new Chinese–Russian 
partnership. 
As for cooperation in Central Asia, the Kremlin’s rather weak central 
control even over the regions of the Russian Federation itself in this 
period meant that Russia did not have a strong reach into its lost empire 
in Central Asia. Nor did it have a coherent strategy in Central Asia. 
When officially proclaimed Russian goals in Central Asia did manifest 
themselves, they did not correspond to Russia’s reduced capabilities in 
this period. As for China, already at this point there was strong concern 
for increasing US influence in this area so strategically important for 
China. The rising Chinese economy further increased the demands for 
access to energy resources, while Central Asia also was a potential hinter-
land for Xinjiang separatist Uighurs. Russian–Chinese rapprochement 
could then potentially be beneficial for both: for Russia it was a ‘return 
ticket’ to Central Asia; for China it implied a possibility to explore a stra-
tegic hinterland, reduce trans-border threats and explore resource 
markets.  
During the initial years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the Chinese–
Russian partnership did not seem to be developing. Judging from Putin’s 
first speeches and actions on the foreign policy arena, Russia belonged to 
Europe and would be oriented in that direction. The pro-Western orient-
tation of Russian foreign policy was of course drastically increased after 
the 9/11 events in the USA. Even if Jiang Zemin and Putin had signed a 
Treaty of Good Neighborly, Cooperative and Friendly Relations in July 
2001, Putin’s unequivocal siding with Bush in the war on terror and the 
new close cooperation that followed in its wake signalled that the Rus-
sian–Chinese strategic partnership was of far less importance. There no 
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longer seemed to be a strategic convergence between Russia and China. 
Apparently, Moscow’s decision to allow US military presence in Central 
Asia was made with minimal consultation with Beijing.72   
However, during Putin’s first period, trade between Russia and China 
nearly tripled and, importantly, showed signs of diversifying. Moreover, 
there was a proliferation of institutional links, not only bilaterally 
between politicians, ministries, economic entities and militaries, but also 
multilaterally within the SCO, APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum.73 
Bobo Lo’s evaluation of the partnership in early 2004, which emphasized 
the dual nature of the Chinese–Russian dynamics, thus concluded with a 
balanced and open prediction for the future of the partnership. He did 
stress, though, that the partnership lacked a foundation of shared values 
to sustain it at this point in time.74 
As Russia’s partnership with the West began to crack from 2003 and 
onwards, strategic convergence between Russia and China re-emerged 
and was eventually strengthened by a new normative convergence, the 
very dimension that Lo had said was missing. The re-emergent converg-
ence between Russian and Chinese views and interests on important 
questions of international security was evident in the two countries’ 
opposition to the US war on Iraq and in their complaints about US lack 
of respect for state sovereignty, for international law and particularly for 
multilateral institutions such as the UN Security Council. As shown 
above, Russia also re-engaged in repeated calls for a multi-polar world 
order, which China readily supported. Parallel to this, Russian support 
for the ‘one China’ policy was reconfirmed and strengthened, just as 
China backed Moscow’s approach to the conflict in Chechnya. Thus, 
although the rise of terrorism as the primary global security threat had 
initially seemed to draw Russia and the USA closer together at the 
expense of the Chinese–Russian partnership, time has shown that the 
Russian and Chinese interpretations of this threat and their use of anti-
terrorism to deal with problems like separatism and extremism have been 
very similar and have contributed to drawing them together.  
The convergence of interests and views on international security was 
reinforced by growing multifaceted cooperation between the two coun-
tries in Putin’s second period. As Putin embarked on a second term in 
2004, emphasizing the need for strategic modernization of Russia, he 
announced a strategy to solidify Russia’s economic reach.  This was to a 
large extent a consequence of a conscious strategy on Russia’s part and 
was of course greatly helped by its economic recovery. Also, while the 
Yeltsin regime had been too weak and fragmented to pursue the deve-
lopment of a new strategic partnership with China consistently, and 
serious disagreements within the Russian government on policies toward 
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China easily could thwart such initiatives from the top,75 Putin’s regime, 
with power firmly gathered in the presidential vertical, could much more 
effectively pursue and implement such a strategy. Thus, the border dis-
putes that had been under negotiation for 40 years were finally resolved 
in 2004 and the agreements were ratified by the Russian Duma in July 
2005. Steps were also taken by both the Russian and the Chinese sides to 
defuse the question of migration from China into Russia’s Far East.76 
Significantly, and in contrast to the US–Russian partnership, the network 
of bilateral institutions at all levels was considerably expanded, making 
the partnership less dependent on the personal relationship between top 
leaders.77   
Trade between the two countries has soared. In 2004 bilateral trade 
reached USD 20 billion, and Russia and China then raised the target to 
USD 60–80 billion by 2010. By 2007 Russia’s trade with China had 
reached USD 30.46 billion for the months January–August.78 The supply 
of energy from Russian to China makes up the most important econo-
mic element of their partnership.79 In 2007 Russia occupied the fourth 
place in China’s overall import of crude oil.80 Although there has been 
no final decision on the pipeline routes for East Siberian oil,81 the con-
struction of a pipeline to Skovorodino close to the Chinese border, 
planned to come into operation by the end of 2008, would make Russia 
the largest single supplier of oil to China. In addition Gazprom signed a 
memorandum in 2006 on building two gas pipelines to China. With these 
two pipelines, Russia could cover almost all gas import to China in the 
future. Russian exports of military equipment to China have continued 
to rise; one-fifth of all Russian arms exports go to China; and coopera-
tion in the field of nuclear energy has been enhanced.82  
A major downside of Chinese–Russian trade is still, however, that 
industrial cooperation has been weak and is falling. For Russia it is par-
                                                 
75 See for example statements by the Russian Interior Minister and other government officials 
who sought to portray China as an enemy immediately following Zemin and Yeltsin’s decal-
ration of a ‘strategic partnership’, referred in Paul Globe, ‘Russia’s new Chinese problem’, 
RFE/RL Features, 28 April 1997. 
76 On this see Bobo Lo, ‘China and Russia, Common interests, contrasting perceptions’, CLSA 
Asian Geopolitics, Special Report 2006, pp. 9–10 and 12. 
77 Ibid. p.12. 
78 ‘Moscow considers anti-dumping measures against China’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 4 October 
2007. 
79 Itoh, for example, has seen a potential for a closer affinity between Russia as an energy pro-
vider and an economically booming China in need of fossil fuels (Shoichi Itoh ‘Sino-Russian 
energy partnership: Dilemma of Cooperation and Mutual Distrust’, in Greg Austin & Marie-
Ange Schellekens-Gaiffe Energy and Conflict Prevention, (Hedemora:Gidlunds förlag, 2007), 
pp.57–77.) 
80 Interfax, 2 January 2008. 
81 Putin confirmed in September 2005 that Russia would give priority to constructing the pipe-
line ending in Daqin in China over a pipeline directed to Perevoznaya Bay on the Pacific 
which would primarily supply Japan (‘Japan, in contest with China, will pressure Putin for oil 
and gas’, Bloomberg, 17 October 2005). However, at the meeting between the Russian and Chi-
nese Prime Ministers in November 2007, Russia and China yet again failed to agree on the 
construction of the pipeline all the way to the Chinese border (RFE/RL Newsline, 7 Novem-
ber 2007).  
82 A major deal involving about USD 6 billion worth of contracts for Atomstroieksport and 
Tekhsnabeksport to construct a third and fourth unit at the Tianwan Nuclear Plant in Jiangsu 
Province on China’s eastern coast was signed in November 2007. See RFE/RL Newsline, 7 
November 2007. 
Geir Flikke and Julie Wilhelmsen, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 22 
ticularly problematic that raw materials account for most of its exports to 
China.83 Moreover, in 2007 for the first time since the early 1990s, Russia 
was running a trade deficit in bilateral trade with China, something which 
triggered calls in Russia for introducing trade barriers against China.84 
Compared to trade relations with other countries, the importance of 
bilateral trade between China and Russia has actually declined. In 2007 
trade with Russia accounted for only 2% of China’s trade total.85 For 
both countries, trade with the USA or EU is still much more important, 
and that obviously influences the prospects for enhancing a Chinese–
Russian strategic partnership centred on counterbalancing the USA.  
On the other hand, growing Chinese–Russian cooperation was 
underscored and expanded by the first joint military exercise between the 
two countries in August 2005. With that exercise, the dimension of mili-
tary cooperation previously missing in the Chinese–Russian strategic 
partnership was added. China and Russia also embraced more ‘soft-
cultural’ policies. The leaderships of both nations have sought to change 
the images of each other in a positive direction. Subsequently, 2006 was 
the Year of Russia in China, and 2007 the Year of China in Russia. The 
aim has been not only to increase economic cooperation between the 
two, but also mutual esteem. 
Recently it has been argued that the fact that a normative convergence 
now has been added to the growing strategic convergence is crucial to 
the future of Chinese–Russian partnership.86 This normative converg-
ence has emerged not as a consequence of deliberate efforts on behalf of 
the governments to acquire such convergence, but as a result of the 
shape that Chinese and Russian domestic models of governance and eco-
nomy have taken over the last five years.  
In the political field Russia has diverted from the Western liberal-
democratic model. Russia’s path away from the Western model of gover-
nance under Putin has, as noted above, included many steps, among 
them the restriction of freedom of the press, of independent political 
opposition and of freedom of assembly and attempts at constructing a 
civil society from above. The creation of Unified Russia as a party of 
power and a tool to mobilize support for the president’s policies resulted 
in this party’s total domination of the Duma elections in 2007, and the 
outcome of the 2008 presidential elections was decided before any elec-
tion campaign was launched. Taken together, these steps have meant the 
creation in Russia of a political system where power in concentrated, and 
to a large extent unchecked, in the hands of the president. At the same 
time this system is representative and legitimate in the sense that Putin 
enjoys very strong support in the Russian population. That the Russian 
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elite no longer aims to create a Western-style democracy has been under-
lined in recent years by constant statements that Russia has to do it by 
itself, and by the coining of concepts such as ‘sovereign democracy’.87  
China, for its part, never set out to become a Western-style liberal 
democracy. The Chinese Communist Party never gave up its monopoly 
of power, but has increasingly aimed to represent and incorporate a 
wider range of interests. According to Peter Ferdinand, Chinese leaders 
have aimed for a ‘guided democracy’ which will spread outwards gradu-
ally from greater democracy in the party. They have stressed, however, 
that the path to democracy is closely related to the safeguarding of 
national sovereignty, territorial integrity and state dignity and cannot be 
imposed by external forces.88 Thus, despite very dissimilar starting points 
and other differences, the Chinese model of governance and the ratio-
nale presented to legitimize it have many striking similarities with the 
current Russian model.  
Likewise, Russia is increasingly diverging from Western neo-liberal 
prescriptions for economic reform. Since the arrest of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky in 2003, securing property rights has stopped being a 
priority, while the state has expanded heavily in the resource sector. 
Securing state control, at least over so-called strategic industries, has 
become more important than continuing privatization. Also, continuing 
to open the Russian economy to competition with the outside world, 
which was implemented so rapidly in the early 1990s, now seems to have 
been sacrificed in order to protect industries from foreign competition. 
In China, the state already in the 1990s adopted a policy of holding on to 
big companies of strategic importance to the national economy and let-
ting go of medium and small ones, and this policy has recently been con-
firmed. Ferdinand thus argues that ‘despite the changes in the Chinese 
economy in recent years, the central and provincial state authorities con-
tinue to play a crucial role in determining both its structure and its 
performance’.89 In sum, Russia and China seem to agree that the state 
should play a crucial role in developing their economies. Their strategies 
for development are therefore quite similar – and definitely dissimilar to 
the US neo-liberal model.  
Lastly, it is reasonable to speak of a normative convergence between 
Russia and China on the issue of promoting ‘sovereignty’ and ‘state con-
trol’ as a rationale for conducting external and internal policies. The eco-
nomic success of China and now of Russia, largely due to high oil prices, 
has resulted in a new self-confidence. Both countries can now afford to 
be less deferential towards the West; they both emphasize their ‘sover-
eignty’, their right to do things in their own way and according to their 
own interests. The normative convergence between Russia and China 
has also become evident in their ways of interpreting and legitimizing 
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their response to the international terrorist threat. In an environment 
where security issues have taken centre stage, both countries have given 
priority to order at the expense of freedom, to collective rights at the 
expense of individual rights, and the use of force and military methods at 
the expense of dialogue and negotiation when dealing with their 
respective separatist challenges. 
Thus, while the ‘Westernizing’ Russia used to inhibit rapprochement 
with China, today the two seem to see more eye to eye on these ques-
tions. This adds a normative dimension to their strategic partnership and 
should, as Peter Ferdinand argues, strengthen their ability to cooperate 
because they now can view their interests in a new shared light.90 We 
argue that this has in fact also been reinforced by a new institutional 
dimension – that of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
encircling and engaging the states in Central Asia. In the following two 
sections, great power interaction in Central Asia will be studied as a 
litmus test of the general developments in US–Russian and Chinese–
Russian relations outlined above. In particular we will scrutinize the 
effect of the new institutional arrangements on the US presence.  
  
Building a US Alternative: Russia and China in Central Asia 2001–
2004  
Russia’s retreat from Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and in the Yeltsin period was substantial. When Yeltsin visited Uzbeki-
stan in 1998, he showed not only that Russia had lost its geopolitical grip 
on the region, but also that Russia’s political authority was on the 
decline; the Russian president had to be physically supported by Uzbek 
president Islam Karimov. Yet, Russian interests never abated. Dmitri 
Trenin argues that post-Soviet Russia has singled out Central Asia as the 
region to be dominated by Russia due to the potential fragility of these 
states, their importance as energy providers, and the potential demogra-
phic pressure on Russia’s declining population in the East.91 As Russia 
increasingly flagged international terrorism as a global threat, these 
interests became manifest. Indeed, Russia accepted two new US airbases 
in the region to conduct the war in Afghanistan post-9/11. The 
Kremlin’s acceptance of this seemed to imply that the USA was replac-
ing Russia as the security guarantor in the region, and the increased US 
presence appeared to diminish China’s role as well.92 But in the longer 
run this tallied poorly with Russia’s re-emerging emphasis on a multi-
polar world order as the ideal for Russia, where China would be the 
natural allied to counterweight US influence regionally and globally. 
Hence, already from 2001, Russia increasingly harboured ambitions 
to use the US–Russia partnership as a pretext for regaining a lost foot-
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hold. After having conceded to the inevitability of the US military cam-
paign against the Taliban, Russia resuscitated the debilitated CIS Collec-
tive Security Pact (CST) for these means. Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Igor Ivanov, framed this as a ‘consensus within the CIS’ in November 
2001, arguing that ‘all the Collective Security Treaty countries are taking 
part in the antiterrorist coalition’ and that ‘we will continue our coordi-
nated international effort not only in finishing the military operation, but 
also in the political arrangements in Afghanistan’.93 This implied a shift 
in Russia’s CIS focus. In fact, security was not initially a prime issue for 
Russia’s revival of the CIS cooperation, and Putin spoke of new initia-
tives within the economic cooperation in the CIS in December 2001, 
indicating that security could be attained by stronger economies.94 Still, 
security was the driving force after 9/11. As a first move, the Central 
Asian members of the CIS agreed to support a CIS anti-terrorist centre 
to combat international terrorism. Russian officials also propped up the 
CIS military capacities by drawing attention to a CIS rapid reaction force 
headquartered in Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the head of the CIS 
Collective Security Treaty, Valery Nikolayenko, argued that the rationale 
for the CST should henceforth be to ‘fight international terrorism’.95 
Roy Allison has indicated that ‘Putin presided over a more proactive, 
hard-headed and effective policy in Central Asia since at least summer 
2002’.96 The basic prerequisites of this policy were clear already in the 
spring of 2002. In April 2002, Russian security officials stated with con-
cern that the US presence in Kyrgyzstan should only be temporary. The 
head of the CIS anti-terrorist centre even claimed that US presence could 
increase the threat of terrorist attacks on Central Asian states.97 In May 
2002, Russia revamped the CST to become the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) – implying a Russian-led regional security organi-
zation capable of rivalling NATO’s position in the region. Putin 
followed up by stating in his annual speech to the Russian parliament 
that there would be no security in the region without Russia. ‘It was 
Russia’s principled position that made it possible to form a durable anti-
terrorist coalition’, he stated. ‘In the context of allied relationships, we – 
together with the leaderships of a number of CIS countries – took corre-
sponding decisions’.98 
While initially fronting a strategy of ‘co-existence’ with the US and 
allied forces in Central Asia, national security was a main driver behind 
Russia’s efforts to reassert itself from 2002 and onwards. In fact, the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press statement in August 
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2002, designating the CIS as the priority region for Russian foreign poli-
cies, a choice ‘dictated by national security interests and economic inter-
ests’.99 It quickly became clear that security cooperation with the USA in 
this area was both controversial and not desirable100 and that Moscow, 
fearing strategic displacement, viewed US expansion with increasing 
scepticism.101  
Sergey Ivanov made several visits to Kyrgyzstan starting in June 
2002, reaching an agreement with the Kyrgyz government in December 
to station Russian forces and attack fighters in Kyrgyzstan from 2003.102 
The Russian airbase in Kant was opened in October 2003 and has played 
an increasing role in bolstering the internal security of the Kyrgyz 
regime. Russia also converted its long-term role as a negotiator between 
conflicting parties in Tajikistan to a more sound military support policy 
from 2002 onwards. Rather than abandoning the 201st division base in 
Tajikistan, Russia converted it in 2004 into a foothold for Russian mili-
tary presence under a new CSTO mandate.  This was acceptable and 
desirable for Tajikistan, whose closeness to Afghanistan meant that the 
Tajiks had been confronted with border spillovers. The paradigmatic 
shift to fighting international terrorism within the CSTO also spoke 
more directly to the relevance of Russian presence.  
In sum, the ‘empty’ promise of CIS security cooperation was in 2004 
supplanted by a more steady security focus from Russia in Central Asia. 
Putin stated outright in 2004:  ‘the deployment of Russian bases has seri-
ously strengthened the system of collective security in Central Asia.’ 
Concerning Russian suggestions of cooperation between the CSTO and 
NATO against drug trafficking, Western scepticism about Russia’s inten-
tions for the CSTO discouraged such cooperation.103 This was 
reinforced by Russia’s active lobbying for an enlargement of the CSTO. 
In November 2004, Nursultan Nazarbayev floated a proposal at the CIS 
summit in Astana to cut down on the Staff for Coordination of Military 
Cooperation in the CIS and the Council of Defence Ministers in the CIS. 
Nikolay Bordyuzha, General Secretary of the CSTO, used a subsequent 
meeting to underscore that the CSTO was actively working to form a 
reaction force of 10,000 soldiers with contributions from Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.104 Seeking an inroad with this 
proposal, Russia in 2005 apparently realized that the CIS security 
framework was no more effective than the economic cooperation, with 
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Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova effectively blocking CIS security 
cooperation, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan opting out of the CIS 
security structures. In 2005, the headquarters for CIS military 
cooperation was disbanded and the Russian push for enhanced security 
cooperation was transferred to the CSTO. Bordyuzha stated that ‘today, 
the real military and security and law-enforcement cooperation takes 
place mainly in the CSTO.’105 The edge of the transformation was 
directed towards Central Asia. Bordyuzha outlined that Russia would 
focus on a plan for ‘coalition military planning towards 2010’, and ‘the 
creation of a large contingency in the Central Asian region’.106 Certainly, 
this stepped up Russia’s focus on Central Asia as a region of strategic 
sec
 in 2002, with USD 
37.9
                                                
urity importance. 
If Russia was gaining in security leverage on the Central Asian states, 
it did not represent any major challenge to China in economic terms. 
The Chinese had actively cultivated ties to Central Asian states to meet 
emerging energy needs, and also utilized the SCO framework as a net-
work for engaging with them. What Moscow’s security focus did provide 
was a challenge to US interests. In 2002, the US–Uzbek relationship 
grew especially strong, and was boosted by Islam Karimov’s blatant 
rebuff of the CIS as an inefficient structure, and one designed to curb his 
authority in security and foreign policy. Karimov was also more reluctant 
to see the terrorist threat as something emanating from outside the 
region of Central Asia, claiming that political infighting in neighbouring 
Tajikistan was a continued threat against his country. US assistance could 
clearly offer Uzbekistan a more independent role in the region, and also 
boost the foreign policy ambitions of Karimov. The USA also tried to 
provide incentives for improved human rights records by offering sub-
stantial direct assistance and loans to Uzbek authorities. As Martha Brill 
Olcott has shown, these loans peaked in 2001 and 2002, with a total of 
economic and military assistance of USD 218.5 million and USD 240.9 
million respectively. Military assistance was highest
 million against 9.7 and 0.5 in 2003 and 2004.107 
If Uzbekistan was playing on internal differences between the 
Central Asian states and on direct US support, Karimov departed from 
this in 2003–2004. A major explanation is the increasing normative pull 
of a more authoritarian Russia, which seemed a less problematic partner 
than the USA. In 2004, the US–Uzbek relationship was severed when 
the US Congress slashed USD 18 million in aid due to the poor human 
rights records of the Karimov regime. Moreover, Karimov himself came 
to see the relationship to Russia in terms of a more appropriate 
normative dimension. Uzbek officials stated outright in 2004 preceding a 
rush meeting between Putin and Karimov: ‘unlike the West, Russians are 
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not going to raise issues such as the status of opposition parties and 
human rights. Therefore, cooperation with Russia is more convenient for 
the
rtnership between Russia and the USA in Central Asia were 
fad
 to 
red
exercise had been held. Kazakhstan had purchased military equipment 
                                                
 Central Asian states’.108 
To summarize: Russia was mainly a security provider, and it stepped 
up its security focus in 2001–2004. Russia’s increasing retreat from the 
internal reform agenda and bilateral offers of military assistance 
alleviated any concerns Central Asian states might have had about letting 
Russia get too close. As US–Russian relations were becoming more and 
more strained in 2004 on central normative issues, prospects for a link 
between the allied operation in Afghanistan and an ‘allied’ regional 
security constellation with Russia, Central Asian states, and increasingly 
also China, seemed unlikely. Considering this development it is not diffi-
cult to agree with Roy Allison’s conclusion that in 2004 the hopes for a 
strategic pa
ing.109  
Just like Russia, China did not actively oppose the opening of US 
bases in Central Asia following 9/11. Rather, China distanced itself from 
the Taliban, shared some intelligence with Washington and even played a 
limited role in the war against the Taliban. Moreover, the US-led war on 
terror has in fact helped to advance some of China’s foreign policy goals. 
Under the aegis of anti-terrorism, China has for example moved
uce the political threat posed by the Uighurs in Western China.110  
Nevertheless, the new US presence did little to change China’s long-
term goal of positioning itself to protect vital security interests and 
increase its influence in the region.111  And, even if Beijing has made 
good use of the US anti-terrorist doctrine and also stands to gain con-
siderably in terms of security if ISAF manages to stabilize Afghanistan, it 
has clearly viewed the US advance into Central Asia following 9/11 as 
problematic, interpreting it as an attempt to restrict or challenge Chinese 
influence in Central Asia. Not least did the Chinese regard the US 
military presence as part of a wider plot to control energy resources in 
the Caspian Sea.112 Thus, the introduction of a US military presence in 
Central Asia spurred China to increase its security presence in this region 
as well. Beijing pushed for bilateral military cooperation with Central 
Asian states after 2001. As of 2005 Kyrgyzstan had received USD 1.2 
million worth in military equipment and a joint Kyrgyz–Chinese military 
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valued at USD 3 million as of 2005, and a joint Kazakh–Chinese military 
exercise was held.  
To increase its influence in Central Asia, China has not only focused 
on bilateral initiatives but perhaps even more so on a multilateral initia-
tive undertaken together with Russia, the SCO. The Shanghai Five (later 
SCO) was established in 1996, largely as a confidence-building measure 
to facilitate a cooperative environment for border management involving 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, China, Russia and, from 2001, also 
Uzbekistan. Following its establishment, the SCO had been used as a 
framework to increase collective efforts to cope with security threats, pri-
marily terrorism. For China a strong motive behind this endeavour has 
been the aim of eliminating separatism in Xinjiang, and it has pushed the 
SCO to focus on Uighur separatist networks. The US entry into Central 
Asia after 9/11 initially seemed to render the SCO irrelevant, as its anti-
terrorist mission and rationale in Central Asia were now taken on by the 
world’s only superpower. Eventually, however, the entry of the USA in 
itself became an event that triggered efforts from both China and Russia 
to strengthen the SCO. The SCO was viewed and used by China and 
Russia as a common platform to increase their influence at the expense 
of the USA already in this period. Thus, within the SCO there has been a 
deepening level of security cooperation. In summer 2003 the SCO held 
its first-ever military exercise. In June 2004 a regional anti-terrorist body, 
the SCO Anti-terrorism Center, was established to fight ‘terrorism, 
extremism and separatism’. A ‘heads of state meeting’ was formally 
inaugurated in June 2004. 
Apart from strengthening bilateral military links and enhancing 
multilateral cooperation through the SCO, both China and Russia 
increased their economic activity in, and cooperation with, the Central 
Asian countries between 2001 and 2004. The energy resources in Central 
Asia are vital to the USA, and the BCT pipeline ensures that Kazakhstan 
will be an important partner in the future. Nevertheless, both Russia and 
China seem to have overtaken the USA also in this sphere.  
Russia sought to become the primary transit country for energy 
resources from Central Asia and has been particularly eager to dominate 
the region’s gas industry. Through Gazprom’s pipeline system, dating 
back to Soviet times, Russia increased its influence through negotiating 
long-term deals for supply of gas. This particularly concerns Kazakhstan, 
but also the other four Central Asian states.113 Russia’s inroads to 
Turkmenistan were boosted by a strategic gas agreement signed by Putin 
and Niazov on 10 April 2003. The agreement singled out Turkmenistan 
as a provider of gas to the Russian markets until 2028, limited only by an 
agreement with Ukraine. Russia’s gas deal was apparently also paralleled 
by an undisclosed bilateral security agreement.114 The Transneft state 
pipeline system has been the principal tool for increasing control over oil 
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transit, and a 2002 agreement secured Russia a dominant role in oil 
transit from Kazakhstan for 15 years. Through the United Energy 
Systems of Russia (RAO-UES), Russia also increased investments in 
hydropower energy in Tajikistan and to a lesser extent in Kyrgyzstan in 
the period 2001–2004.115 With increasing control over hydroelectric 
power in Central Asia, Russia has been gaining a critical voice in the 
management of the region’s water resources. 
For China, seeking further energy supplies for its modernization, 
Central Asia is crucial as a supplier of oil and gas. Increasing ownership 
of oil and gas assets probably became Beijing’s first priority vis-à-vis 
Central Asia. Chinese state-owned oil companies managed to outbid 
rivals for controlling interests of several major oilfields in western 
Kazakhstan in this period, and China thus acquired an important entry to 
Kazakh energy development.116 In 2004 the Kazakhs and Chinese agreed 
on building a new jointly owned oil pipeline from Atyrau to Alashankou 
on the Kazakh–Chinese border. The Chinese also reached preliminary 
agreements on oil and gas development and other Chinese investments 
in Uzbekistan in this period. For example, the Chinese National 
Petroleum Company signed deals with Uzbekneftegaz on smaller oil-
fields in the Bukhara area. Concerning Turkmenistan, suggestions were 
made to import Turkmen gas via a pipeline going through Kazakhstan 
and further onto Xinjiang in China.  
In addition to growing energy cooperation, the Chinese had a major 
trading presence in Central Asia already at this time, and trade with 
China became increasingly important for all the Central Asian states. 
Moreover, China seems to have been the only state eager to invest in the 
rather poor Kyrgyzstan, where small and medium-sized Chinese 
investors began to dominate several economic sectors.117  
The normative appeal of the big powers among the Central Asian 
leaderships also seemed to be changing by the end of this period. Writing 
in 2003, Rajan Menon pointed out that the US presence in Central Asia 
would endure in part because the appeal of a USA one-sidedly focusing 
on the terrorist threat while not talking about human rights demands, 
would be great among the Central Asian leaders.118 However, that appeal 
was lost in 2004, when the Bush administration launched a new focus on 
the promotion of democracy. As noted, Uzbekistan, the state most eager 
to attach itself to the USA after 2001, started to re-orient itself following 
Bush’s new focus on human rights and democracy. According to Anna 
Matveeva, not only have most Central Asian leaders felt inferior to their 
Western counterparts, they have increasingly felt that the democracy dis-
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course and democracy promotion singled them out for punishment.119 
This has been accompanied by disappointment in the poorer countries 
of Central Asia at the size of the annual foreign assistance packages 
received from the USA in exchange for their security cooperation. While 
military assistance rose strikingly in 2002 and 2003, it dropped sharply in 
the next two years.120  
By contrast, the increasingly authoritarian outlook of the Central 
Asian regimes was matched by that of Russia. Putin’s model of ‘sover-
eign democracy’ definitely had more appeal in Central Asia than the 
Bush administration’s new rhetoric. And, in certain respects, Putin 
became a role model for Central Asian leaders. This new normative fit 
came in addition to Russia’s traditional main assets in comparison to 
other great powers in Central Asia: common past, with shared language, 
culture and information systems.121 Today’s Central Asian and Russian 
leaders thus understand each other and the ways of engagement. This is 
a basic prerequisite for increased Russian influence in Central Asia. 
Similarly, also China has a non-liberal political system matching those 
of the Central Asian states, and has not been pushing a democracy and 
human rights agenda in its relations with Central Asian leaders. Beijing 
has not exactly been encouraging these leaders to create autocratic 
regimes, but shares the belief that security threats come from groups 
with extremist ideologies and are not produced by domestic policies and 
human rights abuses.122 Moreover, although China lacks the legacy of 
being the regional hegemon in Central Asia, territorial concessions by the 
Central Asian states to China in the 1990s already then marked recogni-
tion of China’s potential for hegemonic power in the region. There is 
great admiration among Central Asian leaders for China’s ability to 
promote high rates of economic growth while maintaining a controlled 
political regime. Thus, as of 2004 also China seemed to be in a better 
position than the USA to increase its influence in Central Asia, particu-
larly in view of what seemed to be concerted Chinese–Russian intentions 
and efforts to replace the US presence in Central Asia. This will be dis-
cussed in detail below. 
 
Successful Cooperation? China and Russia in Central Asia after 
2004  
As indicated above, two main common interests stand out as under-
pinning the Chinese–Russian strategic partnership in Central Asia. One 
involves countering the threats of ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’ 
a phrase often reiterated in SCO rhetoric and indeed mirrored in the 
work of the organization. The other is opposing US influence. Concern-
ing this second common interest, we contend that both China and Rus-
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sia have clearly stepped up the use of the SCO as a vehicle to oppose 
and even supplant US influence in Central Asia since 2004. As we have 
traced below, this can be seen both in their ‘talk’ and in their ‘walk’. Not-
ably, the general notion of rapprochement between China and Russia has 
generated pressure on the Central Asian states that immediately after 
9/11 sought an independent and balancing role between the great pow-
ers. Their base policies have shifted, and US inroads have been fewer. 
We approach this below with a general outline of SCO statements, mili-
tary exercises and direct assistance and their effect on single states, with 
Uzbekistan as the clearest example of a turn-around. We also assess how 
economic cooperation and normative appeal have contributed to draw-
ing the Central Asian states closer to Russia and China. 
The final statement of the summer 2005 SCO summit, held in 
Astana, indirectly criticized Washington for seeking to monopolize and 
dominate international affairs.123 China and Russia were reportedly 
responsible for penning this statement,124 and this talk was swiftly 
followed by the first Russian–Chinese military exercises conducted 
within the SCO frame.125 The common interest in countering the USA 
was evident in the large ‘Peace Mission 2005’ organized by China and 
Russia on the Shandon Peninsula in the Yellow Sea in August 2005. 
Despite the declaration by both China and Russia that the exercise was 
aimed at combating ‘terrorism, extremism and separatism’, several Rus-
sian officials underlined that the exercise also could serve to bind the 
Russian and Chinese military together and enable them to take on other 
common tasks within the SCO frame.126 Moreover, the practical arrange-
ments of the exercise seemed to indicate targets other than terrorists, 
extremists and separatists. The exercise involved nearly 10,000 troops, 
advanced aircraft and army navy, air force, marine, airborne, and logistics 
units from both countries and included large-scale troop manoeuvres. 
During the exercise Russia demonstrated the supersonic ‘carrier-buster’ 
cruise missile Moskit, one of the most advanced weapons in its arsenal 
and, as Ariel Cohen noted, clearly designed to get the attention of the US 
Navy.127 Thus, it was not without reason that the Russian daily Nezavisi-
maya gazeta suggested that the exercise added a new military component to 
the agenda and workings of the SCO, different from the well-established 
rationale of fighting terrorism and signalling a growing ambition in the 
field of traditional security policy.128  Russian media framed the exercise 
as a ‘strike against the US strategy of a unipolar world’,129 and Russia 
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used the ‘Peace Mission 2005’ to once more raise the Primakovian idea 
of a ‘triangle’ consisting of India, Russia and China. Referring to the 
large-scale exercise, Sergey Ivanov announced that India would perhaps 
be invited as a SCO observer to similar events in the future.130 
Joint statements on opposing the USA began emanating not only 
from exercise patterns, but also from SCO ‘summitry’. The 2007 summit 
held in Bishkek again underlined the rapid expansion of the SCO as an 
influential organization in Central Asia. Apart from the six member 
states, the observer states Pakistan, Iran, India and Mongolia were 
represented. Moreover, Turkmenistan’s president Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov and Afghanistan’s president Hamid Kharzai took 
part in the meeting as special guests. This was the first time a Turkmen 
leader attended a SCO summit. The significance of Hamid Kharzai’s 
presence was underlined by Putin’s suggestion that the SCO should 
increase security cooperation with that country and hold a special secure-
ity conference on Afghanistan.131 Calls for a multi-polar world order 
were repeated by several SCO leaders in their statements during the sum-
mit. Also, the 2007 SCO Bishkek Declaration starts with criticism of uni-
lateral action in the international arena and goes on to stress that 
‘stability and security in Central Asia can be provided first and foremost 
by the forces of the region’s states on the basis of international organi-
zations already established in the region.’132  
Following up on the Bishkek summit a ‘Peace Mission 2007’ joint 
counter-terrorism exercise was held in China and in Russia (Chelyabinsk) 
on 9–17 August 2007. It reportedly involved 6,500 personnel from all 
SCO participant states, as well as 1000 units of military hardware – 500 
from Russia alone.133 Despite claims by both the Chinese ambassador to 
Russia Liu Gushang and Russian General Yuri Baluyevsky that the SCO 
joint military exercise would not target any other country and that the 
SCO would not become a military bloc,134 the exercise demonstrated that 
military coordination and synchronization within the SCO domestically 
and internationally had reached higher levels. The fact that the military 
exercise was combined with the political summit has also been 
interpreted as indicating that political and military objectives are coming 
into line with each other, contradicting the denial that the SCO would 
develop into a political military security organization.135 Also, the selec-
tion of aircraft and the presence of paratroopers indicate that the man-
oeuvres involve training of a possible joint rapid deployment force, a 
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sign of collective security arrangements.136 Military manoeuvres were 
directed at fighting international terrorism, press reports stated, but the 
participation of Chinese military aircraft, paratroopers, artillery and heavy 
armoured vehicles (tanks) and manoeuvres for the use of WMD against a 
potential enemy, told a different story.137 
Putin apparently utilized the pretext of the exercise to flex muscles 
also globally. As Russian strategic bombers renewed their flights in the 
North Sea, Putin announced at the SCO event that Russia would support 
its economic interests with military power.138 Hence, by flagging the 
SCO, Putin also informed the world community that the SCO was seek-
ing more than simply a regional role – it represented a constellation of 
powers for – in Moscow’s terms – a more ‘democratic world order’.139  
The flexing of military capacities has been underpinned by a new 
focus on direct assistance. Uzbekistan was – after the Andijan events – 
increasingly under influence from China and Russia to bandwagon on 
the SCO. The final statement of the summer 2005 SCO summit directly 
demanded that non-regional powers eventually remove military bases 
stationed in member countries and called for a timeline for such with-
drawal.140 Apart from official SCO statements Russian spin-doctors had 
actively referred to Andijan as yet another pretext for Uzbekistan to 
consider joining the SCO, the only organization that could ‘facilitate the 
decline of US influence in the region’.141 In August 2005, Uzbek 
authorities requested the USA to vacate the base at Karshi-Khanabad 
within 180 days, allegedly disgruntled by the fact that US forces had 
evacuated refugees from Andijan in Kyrgyzstan, but obviously at the 
same time attracted by the ‘pull’ of Russia and the SCO.  
In 2005 China and Russia also lobbied the SCO towards Kyrgyzstan. 
The Tulip Revolution, which brought Bakiyev to power in 2005, was not 
viewed as a US-sponsored one by the winner himself. The fact that the 
new government re-established relations with Moscow faster than with 
Washington after President Akayev’s departure shows that the labelling 
of the new regime as pro-Western was premature. Following the Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, Russian media speculated 
extensively over the positions of Kyrgyzstan, arguing that the US base 
was but a pretext for gathering information about China. In addition to 
blaming the EU, OSCE and USA for exporting revolutions, it was sug-
gested that the 24 March 2005 uprisings, when Akayev fled to 
Kazakhstan, potentially could aggravate trans-border separatism in the 
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Uighur province and consequently that China had considerable interests 
in keeping Kyrgyzstan in the SCO.142 Moreover, Putin commented to the 
events that they were ‘no surprise’, while a member of Unified Russia, 
Mikhail Gryshankov, stated: ‘I am deeply convinced that the organizer of 
these two events should be sought in the same place – the United 
States’.143 Subsequently, the Kyrgyz ambassador to Russia announced in 
July 2005 that the US base in Kyrgyzstan was not there for the long haul, 
and that the military base held by Russia was ‘a correct strategic prior-
ity’.144 In December 2005, Kyrgyz authorities demanded a raise in the 
rental to USD 200 million annually, Russian media reported, adding that 
Kyrgyz–US relations were under ‘strain’ due to several incidents.145 
Kyrgyz authorities have not yet ousted the US base, but signals from the 
Kyrgyz leadership indicating that the base’s days are counted have 
increased. In May 2007 President Bakiyev announced that a commission 
had been formed to review the bilateral agreement concerning the 
base.146 
Also in the economic sphere there have been signs that Western 
interests in Central Asia are being replaced by Russian and Chinese ones. 
A wave of redistribution of private assets has been underway in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Many foreign companies have had their 
contracts re-negotiated, and assets have been redistributed in favour of 
Russian, Chinese and Kazakh investors. For example, a Canadian 
company, PetroKazakhstan, changed hands in 2005, with Chinese capital 
behind the deal.147 It is also telling that following the first opening up of 
Turkmenistan’s economy after the death of President Saparmyrat 
Niyazov in 2006, two pipeline deals were signed, one with Russia and 
one with China (see below).  
Notably, over the last few years the SCO has, by strengthening its 
role in the energy sector, become a vehicle for accelerating this develop-
ment. At the 2006 SCO summit in Shanghai, several energy deals were 
arranged between member countries, but also with countries that have 
acquired observer status in SCO (Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan and India). 
And, in July 2007 the ‘energy club’ was established within the SCO 
framework. The regulations of this ‘club’ explain that it unites energy 
producers, consumers and transit countries in coordination of energy 
strategies with the aim of increasing energy security. The 2007 summit in 
Bishkek testified to the new emphasis on the economic dimension. Dur-
ing the summit, the SCO state leaders said that they could ensure not 
only regional stability but also energy security in the region, without out-
side assistance.148 
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Kazakhstan is the Central Asian country which most clearly 
demonstrates the ‘pull’ of the SCO’s increasing focus on the economic 
dimension. Kazakhstan’s stake in the SCO has mainly been within the 
field of energy, and less so in security. Hosting the SCO in Astana in 
June 2005, Nursultan Nazarbayev stated that ‘cooperation within the 
field of energy has a strategic significance for a common development 
[of the region]’.149 Nazarbayev’s comment was tailored to highlight the 
oil pipeline Atashu–Alashankou that was projected to be finished by the 
end of that year, covering a distance of 3000 kilometers, and providing 
China with 20 billion tons of oil annually (see below). During the 2007 
SCO summit, Nazarbayev while presenting the strategy for the ‘energy 
club’ said that forming an oil and gas club was one of the pivotal ideas 
for the SCO, and that the existing pipeline system linking Russia, 
Kazakhstan and China could serve as a basis for establishing a uniform 
SCO market.150 Surely, this ‘pull’ is also desirable for Kazakhstan, as it 
creates opportunities for manoeuvring. As Dmitri Trenin contends, 
Kazakh authorities have had the ambition of becoming something like a 
‘third pillar’ alongside with Russian and China in the SCO.151 
Thus, the new strategic convergence which has emerged between 
Russia and China has clearly influenced developments in the SCO, and 
Moscow and Beijing have used the SCO to enhance their strategic influ-
ence in Central Asia at the expense of Washington. We would also argue 
that the new normative convergence between Russia and China seems to 
have had the same effect, as mirrored in the Charter of the SCO. Its 
Article 2 (Principles) explicitly states that sovereignty, territorial integrity 
of states and non-interference in internal affairs are crucial principles for 
the member states. There are no references to democracy, human rights 
or the right to self determination.152 This normative profile is also 
evident if one studies SCO statements over time. The final statement of 
the 2005 SCO summit stressed ‘democratization of international rela-
tions’, an indirect criticism of US unilateralism and interventions, but 
made no mention of the word ‘democracy’ in relation to domestic 
affairs. Rather it stressed that ‘every people must have the right to 
choose its own way of development’ and that ‘in the area of human 
rights it is necessary to respect strictly and consecutively historical tradi-
tion and national features of every people, sovereign equality of all 
states’.153 This insistence on the right to pursue particular ‘models of 
development’, on non-interference in internal affairs and the need to 
‘safeguard sovereignty, security and territorial integrity’ became even 
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more explicit in the 2006 Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the 
SCO and was repeated in the 2007 Bishkek Declaration.154  
The normative convergence outlined in the basic documents of the 
SCO has manifested itself also in concrete practices. If the documents 
fail to mention anything about democracy and human rights, the SCO 
has served as a vehicle for member-states to applaud their holding of 
elections. SCO electoral missions have consequently countered OSCE/ 
ODHIR statements that elections have not been fair and rather boosted 
the ‘legitimacy’ of these elections. After having blocked the pre-electoral 
OSCE observer mission to monitor Russia’s 2007 parliamentary elec-
tions, Russia was backed by solidarity declarations from CIS and SCO 
observers who claimed the elections to have been ‘free and legitimate’ – 
without specifying how they defined the term ‘legitimate’.155 Moreover, 
as Uzbekistan prepared to hold presidential elections in December 2007, 
CIS and SCO observers claimed that there were ‘no violations’ in the 
electoral struggle, while overlooking the obvious facts of uneven distri-
bution of power and media coverage throughout the campaign.156 The 
presidential elections in Kazakhstan in August 2007 also replicated the 
ceremonial ‘free and legitimate’ statements from SCO observers, with 
vague suggestions that also the OSCE was satisfied.157 In sum, apart 
from rubber-stamping the persistence of super-presidential political 
systems and the gradual slide of constitutional amendments towards 
unchecked presidential powers,158 the SCO statements also introduced 
the variable of ‘legitimacy’ a kind of talisman, rendering the holding of 
elections as ‘legitimate’ with reference to the normative specificity of a 
‘democratic international order’.  
The net effect of this policy has been to bestow on authoritarian 
regimes a halo of legitimacy, thereby reducing the attraction of US influ-
ence. Uzbekistan’s break with the USA in 2005 and subsequent realign-
ment with Russia provides the clearest example of how decisive the ‘fit’ 
between norms guiding the Central Asian regimes and those adhered to 
by Russia and China has been. While Uzbekistan sought to break with 
the USA because of democracy and human rights demands, it was drawn 
towards Russia and the SCO by explicit rejection of such demands by 
Russia and China. When troops fired at anti-government protesters dur-
ing the Andijan events it was described and criticized by the USA as a 
massacre and a human rights problem, while the SCO described it as an 
‘anti-terrorist operation’. During the SCO summit in Shanghai in June 
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2006 Putin also claimed that US behaviour in Uzbekistan was that of a 
‘bull in a China shop’ and that the USA was seeking to impose outside 
democratic standards on a volatile region plagued by Islamic radicalism. 
He urged the USA to treat Uzbekistan with care and said that ‘we do not 
want the same situation to emerge in Uzbekistan, like that in 
Afghanistan’.159  
The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 sounded alarm bells in 
Moscow and in Beijing, raising the uncomfortable spectre of a Chinese 
popular uprising. A report by the Chinese President Hu Jintao, dissemi-
nated inside the party, outlined a series of measures aimed at nipping a 
potential Chinese ‘colour revolution’ in the bud. Measures included a 
crackdown on NGOs (particularly those with a human rights and demo-
cracy agenda sponsored from the West), stopping their registration, 
freezing their activities and using security agencies and forces to target 
them. 160 As soon as revolution ebbed out and it became clear that 
Kyrgyzstan would not choose the ‘Western path’ after all, Washington’s 
normative demands were increasingly used by Beijing and Moscow as an 
argument for ousting the US base at Manas. Moreover, Kyrgyz rhetoric 
during 2007 has suggested that the US presence is increasingly unpopular 
both with Kyrgyz authorities and the public.161 When Kyrgyz authorities 
in 2007 signalled that they would reconsider the bilateral agreement on 
the base at Manas, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov pinpointed the 
advantage of Russia’s and China’s normative stand by stating: ‘this issue 
has matured in society, and there are probably reasons for this. One of 
them may be active interference by Americans, of staff of the US 
embassy in Kyrgyzstan or foreign non-governmental organizations, in 
Kyrgyzstan’s internal affairs. Americans do this all over the world.’162 
Thus, our claim is that the normative convergence which has 
emerged between Russia and China has not only informed the norms 
guiding the SCO, but has also been an asset in attracting the Central 
Asian states to the SCO and drawing them into partnership with Russia 
and China at the expense of the USA. Looking at great-power interaction 
in Central Asia it is fair to say that the normative convergence between 
the two countries has come in as a second layer strengthening their 
strategic partnership and empowering them to reach their common goals 
in the region.  
One should not underestimate the significance of the SCO as an 
arena for developing the Russian–Chinese partnership and as a success-
ful vehicle for limiting US influence in Central Asia. As Russian and 
Chinese regional influence grows in salience, their specific normative 
convergence also reduces the impact of the assumed ‘attraction effect’ of 
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the USA as it manifested itself in the Central Asian states’ participation 
in US-initiated security webs in the mid-1990s. Yet, despite the general 
conclusion that Moscow and Beijing have been successful in regaining 
influence in Central Asia at the expense of Washington in recent years, 
the USA has sought ways to regain what was lost. On a general level, 
initiatives were taken to discourage China and Russia from entering into 
a closer relationship. The USA has also tried to strengthen cooperation 
with Japan and India, for example by launching joint business projects 
with these countries in Central Asia. The USA has even signalled that it 
is interested in observer status in the SCO.163 Finally, Washington has 
taken initiatives to develop a new strategy towards Central Asia. The 
congressional hearing on 25–26 April 2006 fleshed out ‘The Greater 
Central Asia strategy’, addressing Central Asia as a region and not a 
cluster of single states.  
Public diplomacy has been the cornerstone of Washington’s re-entry 
policy. In October 2005 Condoleezza Rice visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan, and Donald Rumsfeld followed up by visiting China 
and Kazakhstan. This was an indication that the USA, while having ‘lost’ 
Uzbekistan, was trying to compensate for this by strengthening its rela-
tions with other Central Asian countries, primarily Kazakhstan. This 
seems to have yielded results. Kazakhstan in January 2006 signed an 
Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. In May 2006 Dick 
Cheney paid a visit to Kazakhstan, ‘a good friend and important strategic 
partner’, as he termed it. The trip resulted in a cooperative agreement on 
preventing the illegal movement of nuclear material and a memorandum 
on mutual understanding on economic development. Press accounts 
noted that Cheney toned down the US criticism of political develop-
ments in Kazakhstan during the visit.164 While in Washington in Septem-
ber 2006, Nazarbayev indicated that Kazakhstan sought a ‘strategic 
partnership’ with the USA.165 US investment in the Kazakh economy 
reached USD 1.5 billion in 2006. All this indicates that fresh money and 
a toning down of democracy and human rights demands could put 
Washington in a better position towards the Central Asian countries.  
The case of Turkmenistan seems to illustrate the same point. US 
relations with Ashgabad have improved following the death of President 
Niyazov and the subsequent ‘political thaw’. During 2007 there were fre-
quent visits to Turkmenistan by US delegations.166According to 
Malashenko, Washington has practically stopped criticizing the Turkmen 
leadership for violating human rights and crushing basic freedoms,167 
something which clearly enhances US chances of establishing strategic 
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and economic ties with that country. President Berdymukhamedov dur-
ing his visit to the USA in September 2007 clearly signalled an interest in 
increasing US investments, and stated that he guaranteed the implement-
tation of all the gas pipeline projects, not only the ones with China and 
Russia, but also the American sponsored trans-Caspian project. During 
the visit broad agreement was reached on energy cooperation, sustain-
able development and security.168 This development suggests that Russia 
and China could lose their upper hand in Central Asia if Washington 
decides to drop its normative demands.169     
As for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, they have not been priorities for 
the USA. The Tajiks signed up for Partnership for Peace in 2002, but the 
preference among Tajik military personnel has been close and coopera-
tive relations to Russia. Still, between 2005 and 2007 Washington allo-
cated around USD 40 million to support the enhancement of border 
security in Tajikistan.170 The USA has also flagged a soft-security agenda 
in evoking an alliance of Central Asian countries against drug trafficking. 
Russia’s response was to try to rebuff any notion of an alternative 
regional alliance. When legislators from SCO gathered in Moscow in 
May 2006, the State Duma Speaker said that Russia does not want any 
organizations parallel to the SCO emerging in the region and he added 
that this was a US attempt to establish an alliance of Central Asian 
countries against drug trafficking. Drug trafficking was presented as one 
of the top priorities of the SCO, but Russia seemed less keen to see these 
efforts as compatible, thus confirming the traditional zero-sum view on 
international relations.  
On the other hand, Washington may still have considerable options 
in Central Asia. Eugene B. Rumer has noted that the USA is situated at 
distance from the region and does not have any imperial past or deeply 
‘vested interests’ in the region.171 This enables it to pursue a more 
flexible response to developments in Central Asia, which does not seem 
to be the case with Russia and China. Moreover, the propensity of both 
Beijing and Moscow to think in terms of zero-sum games indicates that 
frictions between China and Russia might emerge in Central Asia, their 
mutual self-appraisal of the SCO notwithstanding. This can in the longer 
perspective mute the SCO as an effective tool to counter US influence in 
Central Asia and is the topic of the last section in this report.  
 
Brewing Competition? China and Russia in Central Asia after 2004. 
As of today the style of SCO military exercises which resemble that of 
Warsaw pact exercises and also SCO rhetoric which increasingly addres-
ses ‘hard’ defense issues, seem to indicate that the SCO could develop 
into a more traditional defence bloc – one manifesting and substantiating 
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the Chinese–Russian strategic partnership. However, one should not for-
get that initially it was not intended that the SCO would become a mili-
tary alliance in the traditional sense and the SCO has not formulated any 
military assistance article. As Alyson Bailes notes, it would be impossible 
to imagine Russia guaranteeing China’s entire territory against attack or 
vice versa and there has never been talk of anything such as a joint 
‘headquarters’ group of military commanders. 172 Positive military coope-
ration within SCO has so far actually been limited and there are no 
multilateral military or police units.  
Moreover, Russia and China seem to have diverging visions and 
ambitions for the SCO, something which clearly limits the prospects of 
the SCO developing into a military bloc and could become a problem in 
the Chinese–Russian partnership. Russia seems to attach more signify-
cance to the military dimension of the cooperation, while China rather 
seeks to address economic needs through the SCO and seeks accordingly 
to enhance the economic dimension (see latter half of this section, from 
p.38.).  
In 2005, Russian Minister of Defence, Sergey Ivanov, stated that 
there were prospects for military Chinese–Russian cooperation within 
the SCO. Stressing exactly the dimension of norms in international rela-
tions, Ivanov stated that China and Russia would hold ‘joint military 
exercises that would bring concrete results’, but adding that this would 
not result in the creation of a ‘military bloc’.173 Since 2006, Russia has 
sought to underpin multilateral security cooperation within the SCO by 
giving weight to transnational threats, but without giving SCO the 
character of being a ‘transnational’ organization – i.e. one that challenges 
the members’ sovereignty.174 Notably, this intensified in 2007, when 
Sergey Ivanov, in April pressed for closer military cooperation within the 
SCO.175 During the Bishkek summit Putin confirmed this Russian ambi-
tion and again suggested that the member states should increase coope-
ration on security matters. Nezavisimaya gazeta noted that the part of the 
agenda for the summit focusing on security issues was clearly drawn up 
by Russia.176 Russia has also handed over a concept paper to underpin 
suggestions of increased cooperation on security matters.  
China’s response to this initiative has been lukewarm. As of August 
2007, Russia’s Head of the General Staff, Yury Baluyevskii prompted 
China to respond to the concept paper on military cooperation. China’s 
Ambassador to Russia did not appear to give any reasons for China’s 
lack of response other than by underlining the openness and the non-
confrontational character of the SCO.177 Moreover, when the ‘Peace 
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Mission 2007’ was launched by Head of General Staff Baluyevskii, it was 
proposed as a joint military exercise combining SCO activities with 
CSTO activities. China refused this, 178 and Russian proposals to forma-
lize the relationship between the CSTO and the SCO were left unat-
tended by Beijing.179 Thus, it seems that China actually is quite 
apprehensive about strengthening military ties within the SCO, while this 
seems to be Russia’s first priority.  
It also seems reasonable to question how far even Russia’s ambitions 
for enhancing military ties within the SCO actually go. As already noted 
Russia has shown a dislike of institutionalization and of giving the SCO 
any supranational powers.180 Also on the Russian side there is still deep 
fear of and distrust in China’s strategic ambitions and motives for coope-
ration in the military sphere. This was vividly demonstrated when Rus-
sian Generals in connections with the Peace Mission 2007 said that the 
Chinese presence in Russia ‘was a test of communication and informa-
tion support of a potential enemy of China’.181 Such distrust will inevit-
ably inhibit closer military cooperation.  
Russian rhetoric and initiatives towards the Central Asian states both 
within the CSTO frame, where China is not a member, and bilaterally 
also gives reason to question whether Russia is aiming to make the SCO 
a primary security guarantor in the region. The fact that the CSTO is fre-
quently underlined as more close to Russian security priorities and, 
unlike the SCO, is seen by Russia as a traditional defence arrangement, 
validates some critical reflections around how it potentially could influ-
ence upon Russia–Chinese relations in Central Asia. Whilst early analyses 
of Russia’s role has suggested that Russia does not seek to be a military 
power in the region,182 the gradual and incremental refocus on the CSTO 
may be a harbinger of more solid ambitions. The CSTO has been 
revived from the debris of the Russian economic collapse in the 1990s to 
stand out as one of the more effective ways to combat the security 
challenges of the 21st century in the post-Soviet space – at least according 
to Russia’s statements and ambitions. Russia’s attempts to balance the 
USA focused on the CIS during the 1990s and later on CSTO. Despite 
the failure of making these into copies of Western groups such as 
NATO as Russia intended, a CSTO joint military exercise was held in 
August 2006 in Kazakhstan on the Caspian shore and engaged 2500 
troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Since Russia took over chairmanship of the CSTO Council after 
Kazakhstan in 2005, the focus of the organization has been more on 
interstate security. The Astana summit in Kazakhstan replicated a com-
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mon stance on Russia’s OSCE policies and the importance to fight inter-
national terrorism within the SCO and the CSTO. Moreover, the agenda 
for 2006 stipulated the adoption of a plan for forming a more sound 
collective security system within the member states, and also the adop-
tion of a framework for military-technical cooperation.183 In the official 
MFA information sheet on the CSTO, it is suggested, however, that the 
CSTO ‘will face a transformation from a military-political bloc towards a 
universal international organization, capable of reacting against regional 
security threats’ [sic].  
The CSTO has also been reinforced by several assisting structures 
and processes that suggest a strong centripetal force within the organiza-
tion, with Russia at its core. The CSTO signatories have formed a 
coherent group within the OSCE, have coordinated their positions on 
the CFE Treaty, which Russia then again froze in 2007, and have started 
procedures that indicate that the in-states will associate with each other 
even more strongly. In 2006, the Minsk meeting between the signatory 
states’ Security Council Secretaries formed a working group of parlia-
mentarians and experts to produce advice for the harmonization of the 
national legislation relevant for the CSTO – i.e. security legislation. 
Moreover, in November 2006 the CSTO also set up its own parliamen-
tary assembly, a parallel to similar structures within NATO.184  
In fact, the Russian course suggests that for Russia, security would 
best be facilitated by the CSTO, and not by the SCO. Minister of For-
eign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, stated in 2005 that the SCO was ‘not plan-
ning to create military rapid reaction structures’ similar to those of the 
CSTO. Moreover, Lavrov also stressed that although the SCO organiza-
tion would enhance intelligence cooperation against terrorism, the SCO 
would not embark on any actions that would jeopardize member-state 
sovereignty – meaning cross-border action on the territory of member-
states to cope with emergency situations.185 Thus, both China’s and 
Russia’s insistence on ‘state sovereignty’ and ‘non-interference’, central 
components of their normative convergence, clearly limits the prospects 
for further military integration within a declared multilateral organization 
such as SCO.    
Judging not only by rhetoric but also by the track record of initiatives 
towards the individual Central Asian states these last few years, Russia 
does not primarily expand its influence in Central Asia through the SCO, 
but conducts its most serious business bilaterally and tries to promote 
CSTO as the primary vehicle for security cooperation in Central Asia. 
Even if the SCO was used to pull Uzbekistan out of the US orbit after the 
Andijan events, Uzbekistan was first and foremost drawn into a stronger 
bilateral relation with Russia and into the CSTO, not the SCO. In 2005, 
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the Russian press sought to beef up the CSTO to become a ‘Eurasian – 
7’ of the ‘Union of 6’.186 Speculations held that the Uzbeks would pro-
vide a base in exchange for favourable conditions in bilateral trade with 
Russia and also the incentives provided by the CSTO framework.187 At 
the same time as Uzbekistan demanded the closure of the US Karshi-
Khanabad airbase, a memorandum on military cooperation was signed 
between Moscow and Tashkent and a few months later in November 
2005 an alliance treaty between Russia and Uzbekistan was signed. On 9 
May 2006 Karimov told journalists in Tashkent that Uzbekistan’s alliance 
with Russia ‘guaranteed peace and stability in the region’.188 In March 
2006 Uzbekistan also joined the EEC and a bilateral deal was signed in 
which Russia assured Uzbekistan that it would intervene if the Uzbek 
regime faced domestic or foreign threat. Finally, in June 2006 Uzbekistan 
restored its active membership in CSTO. As a member of CSTO, 
Uzbekistan can buy weapons at Russian domestic purchase prices and 
also educate military officers in Russia’s higher military education 
schools (44 in all).189 Notably, Trenin also refers to Russian policies 
towards Uzbekistan as a ‘true triumph’.190 
Russia’s influence on Kyrgyzstan has apparently been limited by both 
the US presence and Chinese interests in closer energy cooperation with 
Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, when we take a closer look, Russia’s bilateral 
strategic relationship with Kyrgyzstan has in fact been strengthened in 
the last few years. When Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov 
inspectted the Kant airbase in September 2005 he clearly stated that 
Kant, as organic to the CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force, was a ‘long-
term project’ and that Russia had ‘long-term development plans’ for the 
base. That year a supplemental sum of USD 4.5 million was allocated in 
the Russian budget to develop Kant and Russia also donated USD 3 mil-
lion worth of military equipment to Kyrgyzstan. Despite the apparent 
backtracking by both Moscow and Bishkek on the demand that the US  
base at Manas be shut down, instead the USA was asked to increase rent 
payments and fees for using the base, Prime Minister Felix Kulov stated 
that ‘Russia is our number one priority for international cooperation’.191  
In summer 2006 the Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs expelled two 
US diplomats for their alleged involvement in Kyrgyz domestic affairs. 
This act was interpreted as an attempt to please Russia before the G8 
summit in St. Petersburg. When President Bakiyev in May 2007 announ-
ced that a commission had been formed to review the bilateral agree-
ment concerning the American base, he at the same time announced that 
‘practical steps will be taken to reinforce Kyrgyzstan’s armed forces and 
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special units, which are part of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force 
in the Central Asian region. This will enable us to work more efficiently 
in strengthening the security of the CSTO in the nearest future’.192 In 
2007, the personnel at the Kant airbase were reinforced by 50%, reach-
ing the number of 1,250.193  
Even if China generally seems to accept Russian predominance in 
Kyrgyzstan in the military sphere there have been signs of a brewing 
competition between China and Russia on military bases. Andrey 
Kokoshin, the chairman of the CIS committee in the Duma, first 
mentioned the idea of a Russian base in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) in May 
2005.194 China responded to this by suggesting that it was lobbying 
Kyrgyzstan on establishing a military base at the same site.195 Russia has 
been increasingly apprehensive about this, a fact supported by Dmitri 
Trenin.196 
Although Kazakhstan has tried hard to protect its independence by 
cleverly balancing the influence of the great powers, the trend had been a 
reorientation in Kazakh security thinking and planning towards Russia. 
In 2006 the Kazakh Defence Minister Daniyal Akhmetov stated that the 
top priority in Kazakhstan’s new defence doctrine was participation in 
the CSTO, although China and Russia remain Kazakhstan’s strategic 
partners under the new doctrine, which also accorded ‘serious attention 
to the strengthening and perfecting of cooperation with the United 
States and NATO’.197 In practice Kazakhstan is also increasingly relying 
on Russia to secure its borders, despite Washington having channelled 
several million dollars into Kazakhstan’s border security in recent 
years.198 Kazakhstan is also increasingly seeking Russia’s help to tackle 
Islamic extremism and drugs trafficking. This implies extensive sharing 
of intelligence between Russia and Kazakhstan.199 By contrast, Kazakh-
stan did not even allow Chinese troops to travel across its territory to 
participate in the SCO Peace Mission 2007.200 
As for Tajikistan, Defence Minister Colonel General Sherali 
Khayrulloyev explicitly stated in March 2005 that Russia was Tajikistan’s 
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most reliable military and security partner. ‘The Tajik armed forces have 
been set up due to Russia’s assistance and contribution. Military technical 
cooperation between our two countries is at a very high level today’, he 
said. He also assessed the opportunity of closer cooperation with NATO 
compared to cooperation with Russia by saying that ‘Soviet standards are 
no worse’.201 This orientation has been reiterated several times since. In 
April 2007 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hamrokhon Zafiri, stated 
that ‘Russia was, is and will remain our strategic partner and ally. We 
have commitments to each other, and, on our part, we will strictly fulfil 
them’. 202  
Further factors suggest that the Central Asian countries have been 
drawn into the Russian security orbit in the last few years and not into a 
common Russian–Chinese orbit. The level of intelligence-sharing 
between Moscow and Beijing is limited, whereas it is growing between 
Moscow and the Central Asian capitals. There is also a substantially im-
proved cooperation among their internal security agencies. All Central 
Asian countries dependent on Russia in arms trade, something which 
facilitates close military cooperation with Russia, but not necessarily with 
China. This might not necessarily be a problem for China. Indeed, Zhao 
argues that China is prone to accept a strong Russian military presence in 
Central Asia because this presence is not new, but has a historical prece-
dence and because Russia as of today does not pose a strategic threat to 
China.203 However, considering what seems to be an increasingly asser-
tive Russian security policy, China’s growing ambitions as a world power 
and Central Asia’s position in Chinese security thinking, this might 
change, bringing in an element of competition between these two 
powers in Central Asia.      
While Moscow, as we have argued, is focused on the strategic dimen-
sion of the SCO and on using this to balance Washington’s influence, 
one should not exaggerate the extent to which the motive of ousting the 
USA from Central Asia drives China’s engagement in the SCO. China 
seems to be as interested in using the SCO to promote economic coope-
ration. Energy is a major, if not the major Chinese interest in Central 
Asia, and China’s economy is its principal political and diplomatic re-
source in Central Asia.  
From the outset, the SCO’s economic agenda has been pushed by 
China. At the 2006 summit economic cooperation within the SCO was a 
main theme for the first time – a new orientation that reflected Chinese 
interests. During the summit, the Chinese SCO General Secretary Zhang 
Deguang stated that the SCO would devote itself to further economic 
integration, and announced that the current goal is ‘the free flow of com-
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modities, capital technology and services in the region within 20 years’.204 
Russia also argued that energy projects in the region should be deve-
loped within the SCO frame and offered its contribution, but the summit 
simultaneously revealed Russia’s uneasiness over China’s economic 
expansion into Central Asia with the SCO as a platform. The reason is 
that China is able to outbid Russia in this sphere, something the wording 
of the final communiqué revealed: China’s USD 900 million credit fund 
for its Central Asian partners established in 2004 with no normative or 
political strings attached, a gesture that dwarfed not only US but also 
Russian economic diplomacy, was mentioned specifically, with the hope 
expressed that this source would ‘help expand regional cooperation’, 
with energy as the primary focus.205  
Russia does not share China’s ambitions for a free trade zone and for 
enhancing the SCO’s central bureaucratic capacity in the economic field. 
A free trade zone within in the SCO would obviously be in China’s 
favour – not necessarily in Russia’s.206 In general, Russia seems to prefer 
to promote economic cooperation through the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EEC) where, apart from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus are members, and would rather have 
a free trade zone within EEC.207   
The SCO and EEC signed a memorandum of understanding in 
Beijing on 8 May 2006. Pledging to boost energy ties, the two organiza-
tions agreed to work to upgrade pipelines and improve regional transport 
systems. Despite such attempts at harmonizing the efforts of the two 
organizations, competition in the investment and energy field may 
become a test case for the China–Russia relationship in the future. 
Russia has at least acknowledged this, by proposing to set up an energy 
forum within the SCO. These intentions were flagged by Putin at the 
SCO Shanghai summit in 2006, and were taken up again in November 
2007. While the Russian government has not been very clear as to its 
intentions, the daily Nezavisimaya gazeta referred to the initiative as an 
attempt to ‘collaborate in implementing joint projects, but also to divide 
the spheres of influence, and minimize the risks of conflicting interests 
between the state companies’.208 This was underpinned by the visible 
discrepancy between the statement by Russia’s new Prime Minister, 
Viktor Zubkov, that Russia would include SCO partners in planning the 
new Russian energy strategy towards 2030 and the realities on the 
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ground. Whether Russia would share already achieved spheres of influ-
ence was unclear. Propped up by Uzbekistan’s joining the CSTO in 
2006, Lukoil and Gazprom began queuing up for huge investments in 
Uzbekistan in 2008, with Lukoil investing USD 100 million in the explo-
ration of a new field, and Gazprom investing another USD 105 million 
in geological gas surveys on the Ustyurt plateau.209 The fact that a 
Chinese–Uzbek company had explored the same region from 2006 did 
not diminish the impression of intense competition.210 
Also the case of Kazakhstan gives the impression that energy may 
become the most divisive issue in the Russian–Chinese relationship. 
Kazakhstan is by far China’s largest partner in Central Asia. Trade 
between the two countries has been growing rapidly; China has had an 
increasing engagement in Kasakhstan’s energy sector and recently also in 
other sectors.211 Although the SCO has served as a useful platform for 
building this cooperation,212 the bilateral relationship seems to be of 
greater importance in China’s pursuit of its energy interests in 
Kazakhstan. High-level visits have been frequent in recent years and 
both countries confirm their intentions to intensify economic coopera-
tion, particularly in the field of energy.213   
Chinese companies are deeply involved in oil exploration and deve-
lopment in Kazakhstan. The Chinese National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) obtained 60% of the Kazakh Aktiubinsk Oil and Gas already in 
1997. In 2003 CNPC purchased further shares in Aktobe Munaigaz, thus 
possessing 85.42% of the stock of this company. The same year 
PetroChina Company Limited acquired full rights to develop the North 
Buzachi Oilfield.214 In October 2005 CNPC managed to purchase 
PetroKazakhstan, an international company which has all its oil and gas 
fields and refineries located in Kazakhstan and an annual crude oil capa-
city that exceeds 7 million tons.215 Interestingly, Russia’s Lukoil also took 
part in the competition to buy PetroKazakhstan, but failed to win. 
Although Astana bought back 33% of the shares in PetroKazakhstan in 
2006, China still holds key oilfields in Kazakhstan. According to Chinese 
sources, CNPC annually produces 13 million tons of oil in Kazakhstan. 
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With the announcement in late 2007 that KazMunayGaz plans to sign a 
production-sharing agreement with CNPC regarding Darkhan oilfield in 
the eastern Caspian section of Kazakhstan, this figure is likely to 
increase.216 Thus, if a decade earlier when Chevron became the lead oil 
contractor and operator in the Kazakh Tengiz oilfield, the USA had 
seemed set to become Kazakhstan’s major foreign ally in energy explora-
tion and development, today it is China that appears to be taking the 
lead.   
In addition, the inauguration in December 2005 of the Atasu–
Alashankou oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to northwest China undercut 
the geopolitical significance of the Washington-backed BTC oil 
pipeline.217 With the announcement on 11 December 2005 of a start date 
in March 2008 for construction of the 750-km-long oil pipeline from 
Kenkiyak to Kumkol, supplementing the Atasu–Alashankou pipeline 
completed in the first phase, the second phase of the multistage Kazakh–
Chinese pipeline project has become a reality.218   
 
 
 
  
While this pipeline clearly represents competition for the USA, this may 
be the case for Russia as well. One could argue that the pipeline implies 
closer China–Kazakhstan–Russian energy cooperation. Indeed, China 
has asked Russian companies to help it fill the pipeline with oil, as only 
half the required amount would come from Kazakhstan, and Lukoil has 
decided to funnel crude through this pipeline to China. However, the 
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fact remains that the this pipeline significantly facilitates oil deliveries to 
China without crossing Russian territory, thereby posing a challenge to 
Russia’s monopoly as transit country and purchaser of Central Asian 
oil.219  
Judging by Russia’s moves, Russia does perceive the pipeline as a chal-
lenge and seems to be stepping up its energy engagement in Kazakhstan 
in response to China’s recent successes. In April 2006 Russia and 
Kazakhstan announced a major agreement on the transit of Caspian 
crude from Kazakhstan oilfields through Russia to Europe. They agreed 
to more than double deliveries via the Baku–Novorossiysk pipeline. 
President Nazarbayev acknowledged that the Russian vector in Kazakh-
stan’s energy policy had been increased when he indicated that 
Kazakhstan was about to rely mainly on Russia in its crude-oil export 
strategy.220 This was confirmed when Putin and Nazarbayev in May 2007 
agreed to expand the existing oil pipeline carrying crude oil from 
Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field to Novorossiisk and to open up for 
Kazakhstan’s participation in the Russian-controlled oil pipeline running 
from Bulgaria’s Black Sea port of Burgas to Alexandroupolis in northern 
Greece.221 
China has in recent years also made successful forays into Kazakh-
stan’s gas resources. To start out with, Russia has controlled Central 
Asia’s gas exports by virtue of its control of the pipeline system stem-
ming from Soviet times. Russia has an interest in keeping this position 
and also needs Central Asian gas to fulfil its export programme. Thus, 
the plans of China National Petroleum Company and KazMunayGas for 
completing a 1,338-km gas pipeline from the Kazakh–Uzbek border to 
Khoros in China by the end of 2009, which will have an annual capacity 
of 40 billion cubic meters,222 has triggered unease in Russia and promp-
ted Russian moves to establish control over Kazakh gas in response. 
Russia scored a major success on this account when a deal on building a 
gas pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan and into 
Russia’s network of pipelines to Europe was made during Putin’s May 
2007 visit to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Although there may still be 
uncertainties tied to the deal, it illustrates Russia’s urge to maintain its 
quasi-monopolization of gas exports routed out of Kazakhstan.223 Russia 
is also rushing ahead to build its own China-bound gas pipeline, the Altai 
gas pipeline.   
                                                 
219 Indeed, according to Russian experts, while Russian oil export to China fell in 2007, oil sup-
plies to China from Kazakhstan have been enjoying rapid growth. This is largely facilitated by 
the rapid completion of the new oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China (‘Russian expert 
urges closer cooperation with China’, Interfax, 4 January 2007.)  
220 See Sergei Blagov, ‘Stung by Cheney’s comments, Moscow plays energy card’, Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, 11 May 2006. 
221 ‘Russian, Central Asian leaders strike crucial natural gas pipeline deal’, AP, 13 May 2007. 
222 Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao apparently succeeded in laying the groundwork for fina-
lizing this deal during his tour of Central Asia following the 2007 SCO summit in Tashkent. 
On this see John C.K. Daly, ‘Kazakhstan moves further away from Russian domination’, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 November 2007 and Farkhad Sharip, ‘China secures new access to 
Kazakh oil’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 21 December 2007. 
223 ‘Russian, Central Asian leaders strike crucial natural gas pipeline deal’, AP, 13 May 2007. 
Central Asia: Testing Ground for New Great-Power Relations? 51 
In sum, China is now challenging if not outweighing not only the 
West but also Russia in Kazakhstan’s current energy policy. This is in 
part a result of Nazarbayev’s deliberate efforts to balance his country’s 
energy policy,224 but the strong drive behind this development clearly 
comes from China. Not only Kazakhstan, but also China has an interest 
in avoiding reliance on Russia. The growing Chinese–Kazakh coopera-
tion might in a long-term perspective sideline Russia – or at least that it 
how it seems to be perceived in Moscow. Judging from the pattern of its 
actions in recent years, Russia is not likely to meet this Chinese challenge 
in the energy sector by stepping aside or launching cooperation. Rather, 
Russia seems set to compete.  
Kyrgyzstan, a much smaller and weaker country, is of lesser signify-
cance for China in the energy sector. On the other hand, the two have a 
long mutual boundary, and convenient transport links have facilitated a 
flourishing border trade in recent years. This is likely to continue when 
the plans to build a new transnational roadway and railway are realized. 
China has also stepped up its investments in Kyrgyzstan. Significantly, in 
2006 Chinese and Kyrgyz energy companies signed a protocol on long-
term cooperation, and the Kyrgyz president invited Chinese electricity 
companies to join in the development and upgrading of Kyrgyzstan’s 
power system.225 
Again, increasing Chinese activity seems to unleash counter-moves 
from Russia to secure its position against China as a challenger – not 
attempts at cooperation. In August 2007 Russia announced that it would 
expand its investment profile in Kyrgyzstan. Behind the scene at the 
SCO summit in 2007, Putin pledged to Bakiyev that Russia intended to 
invest USD 2 billion in the Kyrgyz economy.226 A very tangible result of 
Russia’s new efforts was achieved when Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor 
Chudinov on 28 January 2008 announced Bishkek’s readiness to let 
Gazprom participate in the privatization of the country’s largest gas tran-
sport company, Kyrgyzgaz, and also to create a joint Kyrgyz–Russian 
venture in geological surveying and the gas transport network. Russian 
interpretations have seen this success as fully in line with the idea of 
‘liberal imperialism’,227 and Gazprom’s specific ambition to maximally 
expand its energy presence in Central Asia.228   
Trade cooperation and economic ties between China and Tajikistan 
are still very limited. Russia has remained the most important partner in 
the economic sphere for this small Central Asian country. Indeed, bilate-
ral economic ties experienced a revival in 2007, when bilateral trade 
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reached approximately USD 700 million. In November 2007, the 
Russian government approved a draft federal law on ratification of a 
debt write-off agreement with Tajikistan.229 Another link tying Tajikistan 
to Russia is the large number of Tajik migrants in Russia who send back 
substantial amounts of money to their home country.230  
However, Tajikistan shares a border with China, and there are 
emerging signs of an increasing economic engagement from China’s side 
also in Tajikistan. In March 2005, for example, the two signed a bilateral 
credit agreement worth USD 269 million, and in June 2006 China signed 
a deal for the construction of a highway in Tajikistan.231 By 2007 China 
had invested more than USD 1 billion in the Tajik economy.232 China 
has also indicated that it will contribute to build a hydroelectric power 
station on the Seravshan River.233 Whether triggered by the new Chinese 
initiative or not, Russia has now sought to revive its energy projects in 
Tajikistan: in November 2007 Russia announced that it was prepared to 
complete the Rogun hydroelectric power plant. However, no agreement 
has been reached on Rogun, apparently because Russia wants to have a 
controlling interest, while Tajik authorities argue that they should have at 
least a 60% share.234 This indicates that China’s economic diplomacy, 
which seems to offer cooperation with much fewer strings attached and 
less of an urge to control than Russia, might prove more successful in 
increasing influence in the Central Asian countries. While Russia’s posi-
tion as the former regional hegemon is often considered an asset, the 
post-imperial complex which influences Russia’s diplomacy might prove 
attractive to the small and newly independent states of Central Asia in 
the long run. 
As an energy-rich state that finally seems to be stepping out of isola-
tion and ‘neutrality’, Turkmenistan is a particularly interesting case for 
studying Russian–Chinese interaction in the energy field. In fact, China 
has not only had the ambition, but has also succeeded quite well in 
making inroads into Turkmenistan’s energy sector in recent years. Turk-
menistan’s parliament adopted a resolution on ratifying a general 
agreement on a Turkmenistan–China gas pipeline project already in 
2005.235 President Saparmurat Niyazov in April 2006 signed an agree-
ment with Hu Jintao in Beijing to realize the gas pipeline by 2009. China, 
to make its bid as energy partner attractive and to ensure that the deal 
would be honoured also after Niyazov’s death, offered Turkmenistan 
long-term favourable credit loans, the first to be offered by any foreign 
country in many years. According to the agreement, gas will be delivered 
at lower prices than those offered by Russia to China. Efforts have 
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already been made at building the Turkmenistan–China gas pipeline, and 
it seems that the new Turkmen leadership is not going to back off from 
the deal with China. On 25 October 2007, President Berdymukhamedov 
announced that the construction of the pipeline would be an important 
factor in regional stability and development.236 
Again we note that China’s increasing energy engagement is per-
ceived as a challenge by Russia and triggers competition rather than 
cooperation. Russia has made strong efforts to secure control over the 
export of Turkmen gas lately. The outcome of Putin’s May 2007 visit to 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan was that Russia secured a tentative agree-
ment on reconstructing the Caspian Coastal gas pipeline running from 
Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan and into Russia’s network of pipe-
lines to Europe and the Central Asia Centre pipeline, running from 
Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. When asked 
whether others could join the new pipeline project, Putin answered a 
decisive ‘No’.237 On 12 December 2007 the draft agreement was finally 
signed. The agreement is a blow to US hopes of building a pipeline from 
Central Asia crossing under the Caspian Sea and avoiding Russia, but it 
could also have implications for the construction of the direct gas pipe-
line from Turkmenistan to China.  
On the other hand, closer study of the process leading up to this new 
deal yields some conclusions that may temper the apparent Russian 
success. The signing of the deal was postponed several times because of 
disagreement on a range of economic issues, most notably 
Berdymukhamedov’s disapproval of the high tariffs for gas transit 
through Russian territory. When agreement was finally reached, Russia 
had to pay a substantially higher price for Turkmen gas, and from 2009 
market forces will determine the price level of Turkmen gas to 
Gazprom.238 This indicates that Turkmenistan primarily wants to secure 
its national interests – and can afford to do so. The agreement is thus 
not a sign that Turkmenistan wants to become part of Russia’s ‘exclusive 
zone of influence.’ Indeed, Astana has stressed that it agreed to the 
project solely on the basis of its own national interest, not because of 
‘requests from Russia’.239 In the long run China, with its economic 
strength and its cautious economic diplomacy, will have as much chance 
of succeeding if Turkmenistan continues to develop a foreign policy that 
would appear to be taking shape as ‘multi-vector’.240  
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Study of the dealing and wheeling of Russia and China in the Central 
Asian energy sector reveals clear indications that this could be turning 
into a competition. The latest developments seem to prove that China, 
with its economic weight and its ability to attract the Central Asian 
countries by offering advantageous economic programmes with no poli-
tical strings attached, is strengthening its prospects for becoming the 
future economic hegemon in Central Asia. This clearly challenges Rus-
sia’s perceptions of itself as the region’s traditional hegemon, and triggers 
efforts to secure as much exclusive control as possible over Central 
Asia’s energy sector.241 Both China and (particularly) Russia primarily 
pursue their energy interests bilaterally – or, for the latter, through Rus-
sian-dominated multilateral mechanisms: not through their common 
multilateral mechanism, the SCO. With national interest, statism and 
zero-sum thinking at the helm in both countries, this is hardly surprising, 
and concessions cannot be expected. This illustrates the limits of their 
normative conversion as facilitating cooperation and partnership in the 
field of energy.  
Moreover, the Central Asian states themselves are clearly afraid of 
the two big brothers becoming too strong and have an urge, and the big 
Central Asian states increasingly an ability, to secure their ‘sovereignty’.242 
They are not passive objects. It is significant that Kazakhstan and 
increasingly Turkmenistan and perhaps even Uzbekistan seem to be 
learning how to play the great powers off against each other under the 
banner of a ‘multi-vector foreign policy’.  This can serve to increase 
competition and rivalry.  
The budding competition may, with time, hamper the development 
of the SCO as the main vehicle for promoting the Russian–Chinese 
partnership. Aleksei Malashenko has noted that the possibility of Turk-
men gas exports to China gives Russia mixed feelings about Turkmeni-
stan’s membership in the SCO, because membership would ease 
Turkmen– Chinese relations and create conditions for yet another gas 
pipeline that does not pass through Russia.243 On the whole, Russia 
could prove increasingly unwilling to enhance the economic dimension 
of the SCO because that would provide China with new opportunities 
throughout Central Asia. 
 
Conclusions  
This report has discussed the increasing strategic and normative diverg-
ence in US–Russia relations, and the ensuing convergence between 
China and Russia. Our argument is that the common script of China and 
Russia to balance US dominance has been the main success story of the 
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multilateral efforts and has contributed to give these countries a new 
footing in Central Asia. We have also argued that the SCO retains a 
normative asset – that the orientation of the Central Asian states is 
changing, and that the Central Asian leaders have decided to throw their 
lot in with Russia and to some extent China because of a fear of 
‘coloured’ revolutions. We have also underscored the effect of Chinese–
Russian military exercises within the SCO frame as a signal in inter-
national relations that their combined forces may have a larger effect.  
 Russian and Chinese efforts to displace the USA in Central Asia 
have in part consisted in what Harsh V. Pant calls ‘soft balancing’: states 
balancing US influence by ‘entangling in a web of international institutio-
nal rules or ad-hoc diplomatic manoeuvres’.244 Alyson Bailes and Pál 
Dunay concur with this, suggesting that the balance between soft secure-
ity and military security is also a component within the SCO. In addition 
to being a ‘pact for regime survival: a pro-status quo and anti-terrorist 
organization’, the SCO balances Russian defensive motifs and Chinese 
‘soft’ economic and cultural hegemony.245 The findings in this report 
strengthen these claims. However, we also found reason to question the 
internal ‘glue’ in the SCO and in the Chinese–Russian partnership at 
large.  
 The Central Asian countries have recently been drawn into Russia’s 
security orbit, and not primarily into the common Russian–Chinese 
orbit. Our comparison between the SCO and the CSTO indicates that 
the degree of military and political integration is far more substantial 
within the CSTO than in the SCO. Although the two are generally predi-
cated as ‘compatible’ multilateral organizations, and despite the signing 
of a memorandum of co-operation in October 2007, questions remain as 
to the relationship between these two multilateral constellations. In the 
larger sphere of international relations, a relationship between CSTO and 
SCO – even a memorandum of understanding – may entail a further 
strengthening of a regional anti-US and anti-globalization constellation 
around Central Asia. On the other hand, Russia’s grip on the security 
sectors of several Central Asian states, and the pull of Russian military 
equipment, may challenge China’s interests. In this perspective, the SCO 
could serve as a device for China to check Russia’s hegemonic position 
in the region. At any rate, mutual scepticism and apprehension between 
China and Russia seem to inhibit the transformation of the SCO into a 
supranational organization. Indeed, the propensity of both Beijing and 
Moscow to cherish the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, and also the 
fact that this is embedded in the SCO statutes, would indicate that tradi-
tional influence and leverage will be the major tool for keeping Central 
Asia in the web of the SCO. The potentials for any deeper integration 
seem bleak indeed.  
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Moscow’s policy of incrementally building up the CSTO and nur-
turing bilateral strategic ties with the individual Central Asian states may 
have put Russia in position to claim more of the military functions in 
Central Asia, while leaving China off the hook in terms of contributing 
to the military aspects of the cooperation. As China still benefits con-
siderably from Russian arms trade, this might be in line with Chinese 
interests. As yet, Russia’s increasing military presence in the region has 
not triggered Chinese expressions of alarm or any substantial counter-
moves that would indicate strategic competition between these two pow-
ers in Central Asia. However, should Russia continue to pursue or even 
enhance the assertive and rather excluding strategy toward the Central 
Asian countries, it cannot be ruled out that this will unleash competition 
in an area where also China has key security concerns. Moreover, if 
today’s rationale for the Russian–Chinese partnership is watered out by a 
further displacement of the USA in Central Asia, such a scenario will 
become even more probable.     
 The potential for competition between Russia and China in Central 
Asia is more evident in the economic sphere, where China seems to be 
growing increasingly dominant. Our conclusion is that China’s growing 
energy engagement in the region is perceived as a challenge by Russia 
and has triggered counter-moves aimed at securing exclusive Russian 
control in this field, rather than cooperation. This is a pattern which 
reflects Moscow’s new foreign policy strategy of using energy as a wea-
pon to secure its national interests and defend its sovereignty. Thus, 
energy cooperation, which is often portrayed as a common interest that 
can enhance the prospects for a stronger Chinese–Russian partnership, 
might prove to be a divisive issue – at least when Central Asia is seen as 
a testing field.   
In general, the study of Chinese–Russian interaction in Central Asia 
shows that there are likely to be limits to the future expansion of their 
partnership. These stem from the fact that the main rationale underpin-
ning their strategic convergence today – that of opposing the USA – may 
lose its power if the USA actually gets displaced from the region. In such 
a setting, conflicting security and economic interests between China and 
Russia might come to the forefront. Finally, the nature of their norma-
tive convergence and the fact that it is mirrored in the Central Asian 
regimes can hardly be an asset in a situation of brewing competition.   
 
 
